


VOJENSKÉ REFLEXIE

vedecko-odborný časopis

AOS



ROČNÍK XIV.
MIMORIADNE ČÍSLO 2019

AKADÉMIA OZBROJENÝCH SÍL
GENERÁLA MILANA RASTISLAVA ŠTEFÁNKA



VOJENSKÉ REFLEXIE

**Akadémia ozbrojených síl
generála Milana Rastislava Štefánika**

The background of the cover features a large, circular, embossed seal of the Academy of Armed Forces of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik. The seal contains an owl perched on a shield, which is decorated with three open books and a sword. The text around the seal reads "AKADÉMIA OZBROJENÝCH SÍL GENERÁLA MILANA RASTISLAVA ŠTEFÁNIKA".

VOJENSKÉ REFLEXIE

VOJENSKÝ VEDECKO-ODBORNÝ ČASOPIS

**ROČNÍK XIV.
MIMORIADNE ČÍSLO**



AKADÉMIA OZBROJENÝCH SÍL GENERÁLA MILANA RASTISLAVA ŠTEFÁNKA LIPTOVSKÝ MIKULÁŠ, 2019

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FROM THE EDITOR



Dear readers,

let us greet you all cordially through this special edition of „Vojenské reflexie“ and wish you all the very best for 2020. We also wish you pleasant reading of our military scientific and expert journal.

The Security and Defence Department of the Armed Forces Academy of Gen. M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš held the jubilee 10th „National and International Security 2019“ Conference on 24th - 25th October 2019 in Liptovský Ján.

On the basis of the review of the conference papers by the editorial board and the reviewers' proposals, we have decided to publish this special edition of Vojenské reflexie. Articles written in English language dealing with the issues of national and international security have been selected for this edition.

May this special edition of the journal be a source of enrichment and benefit for you and your practice, and may it inspire you in your further research and creative activities.

Assoc. prof. Ing. Lubomír BELAN, PhD.

Editor-in-Chief,
Vojenské reflexie journal

SLOVO NA ÚVOD

Vážení čitatelia časopisu Vojenské reflexie

dovoľte, aby sme Vás v tomto mimoriadnom čísle časopisu „Vojenské reflexie“, čo najsrdečnejšie pozdravili a popriali všetko najlepšie v roku 2020. Zároveň Vám prajeme pohodu pri čítaní nášho vojenského vedecko-odborného časopisu.

Katedra bezpečnosti a obrany Akadémie ozbrojených síl gen. M. R. Štefánika v Liptovskom Mikuláši organizovala v dňoch 24. – 25. októbra 2019 v Liptovskom Jáne jubilejný 10. ročník medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie „Národná a medzinárodná bezpečnosť 2019“.

Na základe posúdenia konferenčných príspevkov redakčnou radou časopisu a návrhu recenzentov sme sa rozhodli vydať mimoriadne číslo časopisu Vojenské reflexie. Vybrali sme príspevky v anglickom jazyku, ktoré sa zaoberajú problematikou národnej a medzinárodnej bezpečnosti.

Prajeme si, aby toto mimoriadne číslo časopisu bolo pre Vás odborným obohatením, prínosom pre Vašu prax, ale aj inšpiráciou pre ďalšiu výskumnú a tvorivú činnosť.

doc. Ing. Lubomír BELAN, PhD.

predseda redakčnej rady,
časopis Vojenské reflexie



NATO AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS, LESSONS LEARNED, FUTURE

Eugeniusz CIEŚLAK

ABSTRACT

The article discusses evolution of the NATO's approach to crisis management. Using three distinct periods tied to Alliance strategic concepts, the article attempts to analyze allied concepts for crisis management and then confronts them with lessons learned in crisis response operations. The assessment of lessons learned serves as a basis for a foresight on possible future involvement of NATO in crisis management.

Keywords: crisis management, crisis response operations, NATO, lessons learned

INTRODUCTION

After twenty years of allied contributions to international peace and security, crisis management has become one of fundamental tasks of the NATO. The timeframe since early nineties has been a period when NATO strategic concepts, doctrine and military capabilities for crisis management were being developed and matured. The first decade, the nineties, may be viewed as formative for NATO's approach to crisis management. The peace support operations in the Western Balkans along with the cooperation with the United Nations led to development of conceptual framework for crisis management and military doctrine for crisis response. NATO's military learned valuable lessons about complexity of such operations and challenges related to the use of military power for solving multifaceted crises. Crisis management became more important for NATO at the beginning of the twenty first century, when terrorist threat was considered predominant. The Alliance's decisions to participate in ISAF mission in Afghanistan was a turning point for the NATO's commitment to regional and global security. Crisis response operations during the first decade of twenty first century matured Allied approach to crisis management. It was reflected in strategic concept of 2010, comprehensive military doctrine for non-article five operations and development of capabilities needed for expeditionary, counterinsurgency operations. Russia's aggression against Ukraine pushed NATO priorities to deterrence and collective defense, but did not stop its involvement in crisis management. Taking into account Alliance's commitment to ongoing

crisis response operations and its willingness to engage in crisis management activities, one may expect that NATO will remain committed to crisis management efforts needed for assuring international peace and security. Crisis management will not be the only focus for NATO as it has been adapting to the changes in the security environment and places more emphasis on deterrence and collective defense. The article attempts a brief assessment of the development of NATO concepts for crisis management, confronting them with lessons learned in allied crisis response operations and discuss of the future of the Alliance involvement in crisis management.

1. NATO AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT. FIRST DECADE (1990–2001)

The end of the Cold War and political and social changes in Central and Eastern Europe created a qualitatively new security environment for the North Atlantic Alliance in the early 1990s. In this situation, it turned out necessary to initiate discussions on the objectives of the Alliance, its tasks and relations with other countries and international organizations. A signal of changes in the philosophy of NATO was the Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance adopted in London on July 5, 1990, which emphasized the importance of ending divisions in Europe and pointed out the importance of cooperation in the field of security, because “the security of each country is inseparable related to the security of his neighbors”¹. A year later a new strategic concept of the Alliance was adopted, replacing the strategy of defending the North Atlantic Alliance area of 1967². The new strategic concept of November 1991 included for the first time direct references to crisis management. The strategy concluded the danger of calculated aggression against alliance member states in post-Cold War conditions as unlikely. NATO assessed that its security could be threatened by the consequences of instability caused by economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic conflicts and unresolved territorial disputes facing Central and Eastern European countries. The strategy assumed that in cases where such conflicts and disputes would remain limited, they would not directly affect the territorial integrity and security of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, the strategic concept also takes into account the unfavorable crisis development scenario. It was anticipated that some of them could negatively affect European stability and lead to armed conflicts in which other states would

¹ NATO., *Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (“The London Declaration”), London 05. Jul. 1990 – 06. Jul. 1990

² NATO., *Final Decision on MC 14/3. A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Area*, 16 January 1968, Brussels 1968

engage or escalate, covering the territory of NATO member states with a consequent direct impact on the security of the Alliance³.

Assessing the security environment at the beginning of the 1990s, NATO saw the positive impact of the end of the Cold War on reducing the risk of military confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union, although its military potential was included in calculations of strategic balance in Europe. Nevertheless, the assessment also took into account the global context, recognizing that alliance security interests may be affected by other threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interruption of supplies of key raw materials or terrorist actions or sabotage. In November 1991, NATO estimated that there was an increased risk of various smaller-scale crises suddenly requiring a rapid response. The conclusion states that changes in the security environment have not changed the purpose of the alliance and its functions, while the above changes create conditions for a broader NATO approach to its security. Describing the basic tasks of the North Atlantic Alliance, the strategy includes, in addition to maintaining military capabilities to prevent conflicts and effectively defending member states, also the overall ability to respond effectively to crises that affect member states' security. The protection of peace in the new Europe, as part of political and military measures, was to include NATO's assistance in resolving crises that could threaten the security of its members. The 1991 strategic concept included a declaration of the development of broader and more productive bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all areas of European security with the immediate goal of preventing crises, and if they respond effectively to them.

In the part directly devoted to crisis response and conflict prevention, the strategic concept of November 1991 emphasized the importance of responding to crises in the early stages of their occurrence. It was noted that to ensure the effectiveness of the Alliance's actions, it would be necessary to adopt a coherent approach, careful selection and coordination of the use of crisis management methods, including political, military and other. The requirement for strict political control of the use of military forces at all stages of the crisis response was also highlighted. To fully utilize its potential to respond to crises, NATO has declared support for activities under the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its institutions. The potential to play an important role in solving crises by the European Community, the Western European Union and the United Nations has

³ NATO., *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Rome 07 Nov. – 08. Nov. 1991.

also been noted. The description of the mission of the Alliance's military forces assumes that in the event of crises that could pose a military threat to the security of NATO member states, the Alliance's armed forces can be used to complement and strengthen political action to resolve the crisis. A review of the procedures for the use of the Alliance's military forces in crisis response was also declared, taking into account new tasks and potential as well as the deployment of these forces.

In May 1992, the North Atlantic Council officially announced its readiness to consider the possibility of using NATO resources and experience in peace-keeping activities conducted by the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe. A week later, the foreign ministers of NATO member states, condemning the violence in the Balkans and the Caucasus, declared that the Alliance would be ready to support the peace-keeping activities carried out by the CSCE in the form of the allocation of forces and resources and the provision of expertise. The declaration stipulates that NATO action will be implemented in accordance with its own procedures and that commitment decisions will be taken separately for each action (on a case-by-case basis). In November 1992, the North Atlantic Council expanded its declaration of support for peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations, maintaining restrictions similar to those announced in May. NATO has also declared its readiness to assist in the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions if so requested⁴.

The beginning of the nineties was a period when NATO developed its conceptual framework and doctrine of crisis response operations. The terms crisis response and crisis management have been used by the North Atlantic Alliance before, but this was done in the context of military crises related to collective defense. Therefore, in 1993, the NATO Defense Planning Committee decided to distinguish crisis response to activities related to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and activities not covered by this article (non-article 5), which were to include, inter alia, support for maintaining peace and which later period, gave rise to the concept of NATO's peace support operations. From that moment, the term crisis response operations outside of Article V (Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations –NA5CRO), which is now identified with crisis management not related to collective defense, has been used in doctrinal assumptions related to crisis response.

Political declarations adopted in the early 1990s regarding the involvement of the North Atlantic Alliance in crisis response were immediately tested in actions in the area of

⁴ FRANTZEN H. A., *NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991-1999. Policies and Doctrines*, Frank Cass, New York – London 2005, p. 68-69

former Yugoslavia. In July 1992, NATO launched a maritime operation to oversee the embargo against the countries of the former Yugoslavia, "Maritime Monitor", which was replaced in November 1992 by the "Maritime Guard" operation, and then in June 1993 by the "Sharp Guard" operation, which was conducted to October 1996⁵. The extension of the UN mandate in November 1992 allowed the Alliance's naval forces to use force against ships and aircraft violating the embargo, and was the first authorized use of armed violence by NATO to support the implementation of the UN Security Council. NATO activities in former Yugoslavia related to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina also included aviation activities. From November 1992 to April 1993, Operation "Sky Monitor" was carried out, in which AWACS early warning and command aircraft were used to monitor Bosnia Herzegovina's airspace and detect aircraft that violate the flight ban. From April 12, 1993, NATO carried out the operation of enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina "Deny Flight". Along with the extension of the UN mandate, the Alliance's military aviation was not only to enforce a flight ban, but also to support the UN security forces in this country, UNPROFOR. The lack of previous experience in joint response to crises by the UN and NATO, as well as the complicated operational conditions of the internal conflict have resulted in low effectiveness of aviation activities. The fact that the UNPROFOR forces were not prepared to use the support of the air force and the UN restrictive authorization procedures for NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (so-called dual key arrangement) meant that the air force did not initially play a significant role in preventing the escalation of the ethnic conflict in this country⁶. It was not until the massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995, which exposed the weakness of the UN peacekeeping force and the supporting NATO aviation, that changed the mandate and offensive use of air forces to force Bosnian Serbs to conclude a peace agreement ending with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The operation "Deliberate Force" conducted after the mortar attack of Bosnian Serbs on Sarajevo completed NATO's support for UN peacekeeping forces and created conditions for the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement⁷. NATO air strikes created the conditions for the military involvement of NATO ground forces in enforcing and maintaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO military forces remaining in this country for the following

⁵ PALMER D. A. R., *Two decades of NATO operations: Taking stock, looking ahead*, "NATO Review", NATO Chicago Summit special edition, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/chicago/stock-looking-ahead/en/index.htm>, 10.09.2019

⁶ BUCKNAM M., *Responsibility of Command. How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia*, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000, p. 313

⁷ OWEN R., *Deliberate Force. A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000, p. 498

years from 1996 as part of the mission to implement the peace and stabilization agreement, and in 2004 the responsibility for the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken over by the European Union.

The experience of NATO's involvement in conflict resolution in the Western Balkans also includes actions taken against Serbia in 1999 in connection with ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian army and security forces against the Albanian minority in Kosovo. Operation "Allied Force" is an important, but also the most controversial, event in NATO's crisis response operations. For the only time in its history, NATO has decided to take military action against a sovereign state without the explicit mandate of the UN Security Council. The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was based, in the opinion of the North Atlantic Alliance, on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and later recognized by the United Nations principle of responsibility for the protection of persons threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the lack of a formal mandate of the UN Security Council for NATO aviation operations against Serbia set a precedent that then served other countries to justify their aggressive actions against neighbors. Another question may be raised by the way of intervention limited only to using the airpower to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This method proved ultimately effective, but too long-lasting to prevent another humanitarian crisis in the Balkans.

Assessing the experience of the North Atlantic Alliance in crisis management in the nineties of the last century, it can be stated that its concepts for crisis management, including the provisions of the strategic concept of 1991 and subsequent NATO declarations, did not keep up with the practice of crisis response operations in former Yugoslavia. The Alliance has often learned from mistakes how complicated the activities of supporting peace in the context of an internal conflict. In the political debate taking place in NATO in the nineties, the costs of involvement in crisis response were raised, but the costs of inaction in this area were also pointed out, as the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved. The lessons learned during crisis response operations in the Western Balkans had a significant impact on the North Atlantic Alliance's approach to crisis management in the next decade, including the adoption of the Alliance's new strategic concept and its content related crisis response.

2. NATO AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER 2001

The strategic concept adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999 took into account the Alliance's experience of crisis response operations in former Yugoslavia and contained a number of direct references to crisis response. The description of the purpose and

tasks of the alliance emphasized that NATO not only provides defense to its members, but also contributes to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition to security, consultation, deterrence and defense, fundamental tasks in the field of security included crisis management and partnership, which were to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO has declared its readiness to support conflict prevention and active involvement in crisis management, including in the form of crisis response operations. The Alliance, acting under Article VII. The Washington Treaty was to decide each time about engaging in responding to a specific crisis and make decisions in this respect through consensus⁸. Among the security challenges and threats that could have become a premise for crisis response, the rapidly escalating regional crises on the periphery of the alliance were pointed out. The strategic concept of April 1999 also pointed to the global context of threats that could adversely affect the security interests of the North Atlantic Alliance. Such threats included acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and disruptions in the supply of key raw materials. NATO confirmed its declaration at the Brussels Summit in 1994 that it was ready to support peacekeeping operations and other activities with the mandate of the UN Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. At the same time, reservations were maintained regarding each decision-making about engaging in responding to a specific crisis and acting in accordance with allied procedures. It should be emphasized that the Washington strategic concept included a provision on the voluntary participation of Member States in operations or crisis response missions in accordance with national legal arrangements. NATO's openness to cooperation in crisis management with non-Alliance countries and international organizations should also be noted. The 1999 strategic concept pointed to the possibility of the Alliance participating in operations led by the Western European Union, the possibility of the participation of other states' forces in NATO-led operations, and the experience of cooperation in crisis management with Russia.

The practice of NATO crisis response operations in the first decade of the 21st century proved to be more demanding than anticipated in the 1999 strategic concept. In addition to continuing operations in the former Yugoslavia - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, NATO has engaged in the global fight against terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Alliance began its anti-terrorist operation "Active Endeavour" in the Mediterranean Sea and supported US operations in Afghanistan. In August 2003, NATO took command of

⁸ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.*, NATO, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, Washington D.C. 24 Apr. 1999

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), commanding force of approximately 140,000 soldiers and civilian specialists at the peak of operations. In 2004, NATO transferred responsibility for the stabilization operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the European Union⁹. In 2005, the Alliance's military forces were used in two disaster relief operations to help victims of natural disasters - after Hurricane "Katrina" in the US and after the earthquake in Pakistan. In the following years, between 2005 and 2007, NATO supported the African Union in conducting peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, providing air and sea transport to African forces. Starting in 2008, NATO became involved in actions against pirate threat in the Indian Ocean, cooperating there with the US naval forces, the European Union, as well as China, India, Japan and Russia. One should also note NATO's training activities in Iraq in 2004 - 2011 framework and in Afghanistan since 2009.

The first decade of XXI. The century was a period of NATO's mature involvement in crisis management. Due to the lack of threats that would require a response under Article V. of the Washington Treaty, crisis response operations became the basic form of use of the Alliance's armed forces. The spectrum of the Alliance's activities, their spatial scale and scope of cooperation with other international actors have clearly expanded. In addition to peace support operations, NATO conducted stabilization operations, providing relief to victims of natural disasters, protecting shipping, combating terrorism, and carried out training missions. The above period initiated the global dimension of NATO crisis management, when a significant part of operations was conducted outside the treaty area of the Alliance.

In November 2010, the NATO Summit in Lisbon adopted the current strategic concept for the defense and security of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Crisis management has been included in the aforementioned concept as one of three equal, essential missions of the alliance. NATO has declared that it will actively use its political and military tools to: respond to developing crises that can potentially threaten the security of the alliance before they turn into conflicts, stop existing conflicts, and stabilize post-conflict situations where it contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. In the threat assessment in the Lisbon strategic concept, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, instability or conflicts outside the alliance, as well as cyber threats, were identified as the main threats to NATO security. NATO has also noted the growing dependence of all countries on communication and trade routes, as well as new qualitative threats related to the development of technology.

⁹ KOEHLER K., *Enhancing NATO-EU Cooperation: Looking South and Beyond*, NDC Conference Report Research Division, NATO Defense College No. 02/17, Rome May 2017

The assessment of the security environment included direct references to restrictions on access to key natural resources, problems related to climate change, water shortages and health threats¹⁰.

Emphasizing the importance of crisis management for security, NATO adopted a declaration on engaging in activities to prevent crises, manage them and stabilize post-conflict situations, as well as support efforts to reconstruct state institutions. However, it should be noted that the declaration included in the Lisbon strategic concept does not apply to all crises, but only those in which NATO's response will be possible and when it is necessary (where possible and when necessary). The North Atlantic Alliance recognized the importance of a coherent approach, including the use of political, civil and military mechanisms, for the effectiveness of crisis response. Therefore, development of NATO cooperation with other international actors is expected to achieve maximum coherence and effectiveness of the international community's efforts. The strategic concept underlines the importance of monitoring the situation and preventing crises, as well as taking active measures as soon as possible for their de-escalation. On the other hand, however, there is a need to maintain sufficiently long support for activities related to stabilizing the situation after conflicts and to support the efforts to reconstruct state institutions. Contrary to earlier strategic concepts, the document adopted in 2010 indicates specific actions that NATO intends to take to increase its capabilities in the field of crisis response. Some of the proposals are related to improvement of the exchange of intelligence information, civil-military planning and the extension and intensification of regular political consultations between Member States and with partners at all stages of the crisis. The Lisbon strategic concept highlighted the need to develop doctrine and operational capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counter irregular forces operations, stabilization and reconstruction¹¹.

NATO crisis response operations after 2010 focused primarily on the continuation of previously initiated crisis response operations, while some operations, due to changes in the security environment, have changed their scope and character. The North Atlantic Alliance remains committed to stabilizing the situation in Kosovo. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has been transformed into a training "Resolute Support" mission one since the beginning of

¹⁰ NATO., *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010*, Lisbon 19-20 November 2010.

¹¹ Ibidem

2015 and its number has been significantly reduced¹². NATO naval forces was involved in the protection of shipping in the Indian Ocean between 2008 and 2016. In 2016 the Mediterranean Sea Operation “Sea Guardian” has expanded its character and it has shifted to ensuring comprehensive maritime security in this area. In 2011, the North Atlantic Alliance decided to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 by enforcing a no-fly zone on Libya and protecting civilians against attacks by government forces¹³. In 2016, during the NATO summit in Warsaw, support was announced for a global coalition fighting against the so-called Islamic state by making available the AWACS early warning and control system aircraft to coalition air operations. However; it must be stressed that NATO was quite clear that supporting coalition air operations with the AWACS aircraft did mean that it became automatically a member of the coalition.¹⁴ In May 2017, NATO declared full participation in the above coalition¹⁵. NATO decided also at the summit in Warsaw on assisting Iraqi government with training and capacity-building mission from 1 January 2019. The NATO Mission Iraq has been focused on helping to strengthen Iraqi security forces and Iraqi military education institutions. The ultimate goal of this mission is to enable Iraqi forces preventing the return of ISIS into Iraq¹⁶.

3. FUTURE OF NATO’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management has evolved over past decades to become alliance mission truly equal to collective defense. There is no doubt that NATO will remain vigilant with regard to crises on global and regional scale. As the security environment has been less and less stable and predictable, NATO must assess implication on crises on its security and international stability. While a number of well-known crises and conflicts worldwide have been posing continuous threat to international peace and security, there is a risk of emerging crises that may destabilize security environment in short or even long term. This situation reflects in NATO’s 360 degree approach to threats. It must be understood that crisis management will not be the only focus of alliance security policy as it used to be in the first decade of 21st

¹² Resolute Support Afghanistan, NATO, <https://rs.nato.int/about-us/mission.aspx>, accessed 12.09.2019

¹³ NATO and Libya. Operation Unified Protector, NATO 27 March 2012, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm>, accessed 05.09.2019

¹⁴ *Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016*, Press Release (2016)100, NATO, Warsaw 9 July 2016, art.96

¹⁵ *NATO leaders agree to do more to fight terrorism and ensure fairer burden sharing*, NATO, Brussels 25 May 2017, http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144154.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 25.08.2019

¹⁶ NATO Mission Iraq, NATO, 24 June 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166936.htm, accessed 05.09.2019

century. Taking above into account it may be assumed that NATO will remain committed to resolving crises over the next decades. It will also remain aware of possible political and military costs of engagement in crisis management activities as well as of those costs of not intervening. Due to the dramatic changes in Russia's behavior after the annexation of Crimea, NATO had to adapt to new security environment in Europe and make collective defense efforts primary focus of alliance activities. Although crisis management remains an important mission for NATO, it has to compete for resources with missions and investments related to deterrence and collective defense. This probably means that in the coming decade the North Atlantic Alliance will selectively engage in responding to unfolding crises, but it will not take actions lightly taking into account its deterrence and collective defense requirements. The priority of actions related to Article 5 will limit the willingness and ability of its member states for military involvement of NATO in crisis response operations.

Any assessment of the future of NATO involvement in crisis management must take into account ongoing crisis response operations. Although NATO has limited the number of troops in such operations, toned down intensity of operations and searched for viable exit strategies, it still remains busy in a number of areas of operations. Military assistance to the government of Afghanistan within the framework of the Resolute Support Mission is based on a flexible, regional model. Regional train, advise, assist commands across Afghanistan will probably continue to support Afghanistan's security institutions and police, as well as the army, special operations and air forces. As the security situation in Afghanistan remains unstable NATO may be forced in the future to increase the size of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission troops as it did over the course of 2018. There is awareness among NATO military community that continuation of the mission in Afghanistan is required beyond 2020¹⁷. NATO member states will also remain involved in supporting financially the Afghan security forces through 2024¹⁸. Due to the lack of clear progress in stabilizing the situation in Kosovo, it may be assumed that NATO led KFOR will stay there in coming years. The KFOR has been viewed by NATO as an important contribution to stability in the Western Balkans. It continues to be critical for sustainment of safe and secure environment for all ethnic groups of Kosovo. As peace and stability in Kosovo has been remaining a priority for NATO the Alliance will continue its peacekeeping mission based on the United Nations mandate.

¹⁷ GARAMONE J., *NATO Chiefs Support Afghanistan Resolute Support Mission, Look to Future*, 14 September 2019, <https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1960793/nato-chiefs-support-afghanistan-resolute-support-mission-look-to-future/>, accessed 15.09.2019

¹⁸ *Resolute Support Afghanistan. Backgrounders*, <https://rs.nato.int/resources/backgrounders.aspx>, accessed 10.09.2019

The NATO will continue its mission in Iraq in order to strengthen the Iraqi security forces and deny the return of ISIS threat there. The training will continue to include military medicine, logistics and countering improvised explosive devices. Although the mission in Iraq is not big in terms of numbers, it will remain important for counter terrorist efforts in the Middle East region. NATO will probably continue to support the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS with the AWACS aircraft. Operation “Sea Guardian” will remain important for assisting with the refugee and migrant in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly in the Aegean Sea. It is worth noting that NATO does not exclude carrying out in the future disaster relief operations and missions to protect populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disasters¹⁹. An important feature of future NATO’s involvement in crisis management will be close cooperation with other international security actors. NATO has significantly increased the scope of cooperation with the European Union which will probably translate into unity of efforts during future crisis response operations. The African Union seems to become a strategic partner for NATO in efforts tied to crisis management in Africa and coping with global crisis challenges. NATO’s involvement in crisis management in the future will continue to be an important part of Alliance activities. Although the number of troops involved in operations will be significantly lower than during the last decade, the alliance will continue to contribute to management of ongoing crises and will remain capable of reacting to emerging crises.

CONCLUSION

Over a quarter of a century of NATO’s involvement in crisis management has allowed for the accumulation of a number of experiences and created the basis for improving the concepts, procedures and organizational preparations related to crisis management. The 1990s were a time when NATO was seeking its place in a changed security environment and when support for peacekeeping operations was seen as an impetus for the continued functioning of the alliance. After initial negative experiences related to cooperation with the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the North Atlantic Alliance became a guarantor of the peace process in this country, contributing to the implementation of peace agreements and stabilization of the situation in the region. Despite initial controversies related to the legality of interventions in

¹⁹ *Opening remarks by Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee at the Military Committee Conference in Slovenia*, NATO Military Committee, Ljubljana 14 September 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168780.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.09.2019

Kosovo, NATO proved able to force the cessation of ethnic cleansing in this province of Serbia, and then to ensure the stable functioning of autonomous Kosovo.

In the first decade of twenty first century there has been an increase in NATO's commitment to crisis management. On the one hand, this was the result of changes in the security environment, including the increase in the scale of terrorist threats. On the other hand, this approach to crisis management mirrored the Alliance's adoption of a global security perspective, according to which actions taken outside the treaty area contribute to the security of the societies and territory of the member states. Experiences of operations conducted in the first decade of twenty first century have confirmed NATO's ability to conduct a wide spectrum of crisis response operations together with various partners. In the next few years, NATO's commitment to crisis management should be expected. Nevertheless, given the changes in the security environment resulting from Russia's actions against Ukraine, it can be expected that the North Atlantic Alliance's efforts to resolve crises will be less intense than in the previous decade. This is due to the fact that NATO will be forced to take action in the context of crisis management in parallel with activities related to deterrence and collective defense, which already in many member countries already have priority in financing and technical modernization.

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ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Realism as a mainstream theory of international relations for the past half of century, however, fails in explaining asymmetric conflicts. Although there are a few definitions of the term „asymmetric conflict“, theory does not answer to all the questions of reality. In general, asymmetric conflicts, similarly to symmetric conflicts, have an outcome where a weaker adversary loses against the strong one. But the obvious question arises – what is the cause of such a significant shift in the number of cases in which the weak wins against the much stronger opponent? The paper will try to find an answer to this question through the theories of international relations.

Keywords: asymmetric conflict, power transition theory, nature of the actor theory, interest asymmetric theory, argument of asymmetric interaction

INTRODUCTION

Almost 3000 years ago, leaders and generals already knew that just looking strong does not automatically equals being the victor in the conflict. This knowledge though has been repeatedly forgotten and rediscovered over and over again, although the big losses where the price. For the last decades great powers were painfully forced to learn this old truth, that the stronger party does not always win. When we look at it in general, the milestone of the realist theory in international relations has been the relation between conflict and power. The theory presents that, the more power you have, the more likely you are to win the conflict. Of course, we do not want to say, that the premises of this theory are not valid at all, but the reality of international relations show, that we need to overlook the realism theory from different prospective. This can be applicated on all international theories according to conflict and power. However, this paper has no ambition to methodologically assess the context of all theories of international relations to conflict. Therefore, we will focus on a comparison of

various chosen theories of asymmetric conflict and the evaluation of Toft's main question of his work "How the Weak Wins War: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict" – how the weak win wars? The paper will be primarily based on assessing various relevant and credible academic writings, which are focus mainly on the importance of regime type and political vulnerability is put to test. The main theory of asymmetric conflicts is based on the writings of I. Toft and A. Mack. Therefore, there is seven main theories of asymmetric conflicts, which can make the basis for methodological research of our paper.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

The paper will focus on examining four chosen theories, mainly R. Gilpin's *power transition theory*, *nature of the actor theory*, which was researched and analyzed by A. Mack, Waltz and M. C. Desch and the *interest asymmetry theory*, which is presented by A. Mack himself.¹ As was already presented, the paper will also focus on Toft's *argument of strategic interaction*.² It is definitely needed to present, despite the significance of theories of asymmetric conflicts, a very few authors focused their research on the subject of asymmetric conflicts. Unfortunately, even that many authors have analyzed asymmetric conflicts, none of them developed a comprehensive general theory.³ For reference, we may mention author E. L. Katzenbach, G. Z. Hanrahan, which focused on researcher of guerilla warfare. A step further was made by T. V. Paul in his publication "Asymmetric Conflict: War Initiation by Weaker Powers".⁴ T. V. Paul was researching the reason why weak states even start a war against strong opponents. He was using the power ratio 1: 2 and analyzed understanding the power in realist – material terms. A much bigger step further was made by A. Mack, who created a comprehensive theory of asymmetric conflicts based on the interest asymmetry logic. Main and also most general explanation of asymmetric conflict outcomes was presented by I. Arreguín-Toft in his paper in 2001, which was subsequently described in his publication "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict" in 2005.⁵

¹ MACK, A. 1975. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. In *World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 175 – 200. ISSN 1086-3338.

² ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. M. 2005. *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, pp. 18 – 21, ISBN-13: 978-0521548694.

³ Those include for example D. L. Grange, K. F. Mckenzie, J. A. Olsen or Y. Shaohua.

⁴ PAUL, T. V. 1994. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994. ISBN-13: 978-0511598746.

⁵ ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict". In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

1.1 POWER TRANSITION THEORY AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

The first theory that could explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, or the question why the weak win the war against stronger opponent, is the power transition theory presented by R. Gilpin.⁶ R. Gilpin in his work explains that realist writers, such as Mackinder or Thucydides believe, that distribution of power in an international system shifts over a period of time. Gilpin argued that when a hegemonic power reaches its peak, it must eventually expect a marginal decline when other countries increase their relative gain. According to the theory presented by Gilpin, the hegemon's costs to maintain order in its controlled territories becomes cost ineffective. With this result, there has to become clear, that superpower's decline is inevitable. Although Gilpin's theory does not directly explain asymmetric conflicts, this theory might explain, for example, how the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was able to maintain its power and position. When we critically analyze this theory, we have to confirm, that even though, the power transition theory is valid from the historical perspective, because many hegemonic powers as the Roman Empire, Greeks or Germans experienced eventual decline in power, it does not explain asymmetric conflicts that the US fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. First of all, the US did not fight in these wars alone because it always invaded these countries in an alliance with partners. Therefore, overall military capacity of US as a power has never been endangered by the insurgency's sudden rise in power. Second of all, the US won decisively in both Afghanistan and Iraq during the main invasion, but it failed, in both countries, to win against the insurgency later on. When we look more to the past, US also did not decline in power in Vietnam, neither did its power decline in comparison to the USSR, but there is one fact which cannot be concealed – the Americans were still unable to defeat the Vietcong. As we can see, the power transition theory cannot explain the phenomenon of asymmetric conflict in its complexity, or in the analysis of real facts of conflicts.

1.2 NATURE OF THE ACTOR THEORY AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

The second chosen theory – the nature of the actor theory is interested in the discrepancy between the strong and weak argues that authoritarian regimes are much better in successful conduct of war than democracies. Some experts go even further when they state that democracies are a liability in the foreign policy overall. A. de Tocqueville presented that

⁶ GILPIN, R. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981, p. 94, 288 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0521240185.

“to demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to democracy; they require on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.”⁷ Even American authors as M. Small states that “we must accept that American foreign policy making will never be as efficient as it is in undemocratic countries.”⁸ The main reason for this situation, as main of these authors observed, is that general public is overly moralistic, shortsighted and emotional. This makes democracy inefficient in the decision-making process. The authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, give control of the domestic and foreign policy to a very small group of individuals. According to that, this group is able to control public’s access to information. Of course, there is no surprise, when the attempts to gain information or criticize the regime are very often punished by long years in prison, torture or death. Although, there is no surprise, when these regimes are more effective in gathering resources because unlike democracies, they control the public’s perception. By this, legitimacy of war may be altered as the regime desires, as well as information regarding the outcomes of specific battles. On the other hand, the authoritarian regimes often coerce their soldiers to fight under the threat of execution for cowardice. Thirdly, soldiers of authoritarian regimes are often not bound by the laws of war. This is especially true regarding to noncombatants, prisoners of war or civilians in combat zones. We can see, that authoritarian regimes are also likely to ignore international laws regarding to use of chemical weapons, shrapnel mines etc. As I. Toft presents, “the lack of responsibility to a cost-bearing public may allow authoritarian regimes to sustain higher combat casualties in pursuit of military objectives than democratic regimes.”⁹ Therefore, combination of the lack of information among the nation, potential ignorance of international laws, threats of execution and casualty insensitivity should present authoritarian regimes as more effective in asymmetric wars than democratic regimes. But different group of experts argue for the opposite. They state that democratic regimes are the ones more capable of fighting wars. I. Kant and J. Bentham were very ardent in their belief that democracy was a distinct asset.¹⁰ They were arguing that the more people are involved in decision making, the better. E. H. Carr in his publication presented that “Every man possessed of reason is accustomed to weigh evidence and to be guided and determined by its preponderance. When various conclusions are presented with equal care and equal skill, there

⁷ TOCQUEVILLE de A. 1945. *Democracy in America. Vol 1*. New Your: Vintage, 1945, 243 p. 591 pp.

⁸ SMALL, M. 1996. *Democracy and Diplomacy. The Impact of Domestic Politics on U. S. Foreign Policy*. 1789-1994. Batimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1996, p. 169, 208 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0801851773.

⁹ ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict“. In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

¹⁰ DESCH, M. C. 2008. *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2008, p.10, 248 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0801888014.

is a moral certainty that the greatest number will judge right and that the greatest force of evidence will produce the greatest impression.”¹¹ These authors can be in expert publications called supporting triumphalist, which believe that democracies tend to win their wars. According to M. C. Desch, democracies tends to win more often because they choose their battles carefully and even because they tend to have bigger economies, stronger alliances and public support. This premises thought go in a direct conflict with the A. Mack’s theory, which claims, that higher power equals lower interest, which can be further discussed later on. In our opinion, the nature of the actor theory suffers from several dilemmas. M. C. Desch by himself presents, that these theories have at least 5 data problems. Triumphalists use argumentation with no solid ground in their statement that democracies win wars more often than authoritarian regimes. In our point of view, it is so, because there is even no rational ground to believe that the democracies in conflict will stay constant regimes throughout war. Most democratic regimes namely became more conservative in wars, often started to apply severe restrictions to civil liberties that define them as a democracy. There are many examples such as the detention of Arabic Americans after 9/11 or the torture practices revealed in Guantanamo Bay. Even I. Toft criticizes and pointing out that “authoritarian regime’s control over information about the justness of a war only benefits a regime that wishes to fight a war its own public would otherwise think unjust.”¹² Nevertheless, there is no way to know, a priori, if this is likely. Similarly, democratic governments may conceal or alter some information to the public. This argument is supported by many scholars when for example T. A. Bailey presented that “deception of the people may in fact become necessary...the yielding of some of our democratic control of foreign affairs is the price we have to pay for greater physical security”.¹³ If we have to conclude the analyze of this theory, we have to confirm, that authoritarian regimes has more chance to win the conflict, because of the possibility to behave more freely even in opposition to international law. On the other hand, because democracies have both strengths and weaknesses, the regime type is probably not the most important variable explaining foreign policy success or failure. That can be applied also on the success or failure in asymmetric conflict.

¹¹ CARR, E. H. 1939. *The twenty years Crisis: 1919 – 1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York: Harper and Row, 1939, p. 24, 244 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0061311222

¹² ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict“. In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

¹³ SMALL, M. 1996. *Democracy and Diplomacy. The Impact of Domestic Politics on U. S. Foreign Policy. 1789-1994*. Batimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1996, p. 84, 208 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0801851773.

1.3 INTEREST ASYMMETRY THEORY AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

The third theory which tries to explain outcomes of asymmetric conflicts that favors the weak is presented by A. Mack. This theory embodies three main aspects:

1. relative power explains relative interests
2. relative interests further explain relative political vulnerability and
3. relative vulnerability further explains why strong actors lose and weaker actors win.¹⁴

The Mack's theory states that weak opponents win the wars because their interests in winning the war are much higher because their very survival is at stake. This point of view can document even the asymmetric conflict in Afghanistan or Iraq in last decades. Therefore, A. Mack claims that "the American experience was in no sense unique, expect to American".¹⁵ As for another arguments, the Mack's point of view is based on political vulnerability of actors. Therefore, if the outcome of the war does not endanger strong opponent, its interest is logically lower than those whose survival is at stake. I. Toft stated that "power asymmetry determines interest asymmetry (high power equals low interest,) which varies inversely with political vulnerability (low interest equals high vulnerability,) which varies inversely with outcomes (high vulnerability equals low probability of victory)."¹⁶ We also have to pinpoint that in no case of asymmetric conflicts, did the local insurgence invade their opponents' homeland. There is predicted, that weaker opponent is not capable of doing such a thing, et it is still capable of forcing the stronger opponent to withdraw. According to logic of the information stated above, there has to be reason why the stronger opponent is incapable of winning. In 1954, the Vietminh destroyed only 3 % of French forces in Indochina, but the psychological effect was destructive. Fourteen years later, the same can be stated for the Americans. Even though Americans officially won the invasion in Iraq or in Afghanistan, there are many aspects, which are still disputable. Of course, a few arguments contradict this theory. Firstly, we can talk about US and its spending of billions of dollars on the war against terrorism after 9/11. Every politician in the country knew, that it is no necessary according to country's survival, by the Bush's "holy war" skyrocketed his popularity from 51 % on 9/10 to 90 % on 22th of September in 2001. Such an approval of leaders' politics when going to war against other country would be hardly found in any

¹⁴ MACK, A. 1975. *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*. In *World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1975. pp. 175 – 200. ISSN 1086-3338.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict“. In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

authoritarian or democratic regime. Even though the Americans' interest should have been much lower as their survival was definitely not endangered by Al-Qaida or the Taliban, even by opponents in Vietnam War, the US identity as "the leader of the free world" was in stake. We have to present, that patriotism among Americans is much higher than among most democratic countries. The other argument against Mack's theory is stated in assumption that in order for the political vulnerability to take effect, a certain time span that influences the actors' ability to fight has to be present. Nevertheless, this does not explain why some asymmetric conflicts are over, and other drags on.¹⁷ Author of the theory recognizes these weaknesses in his research and suggests that the use of guerilla strategy explains the longer duration of conflict. Although all what was stated, in our opinion, this theory should be generally applicable to all asymmetric conflicts in the past. Yet, the percentage of conflicts that were won by weaker actors is not constant, and has changed over time, G. Merom supports this point of view by statement: "The interest and motivation of ancient underdogs (weaker opponents) should have been unrivaled, and this, according to the motivational theories, should have been reflected in relatively high rates of successful insurgencies."¹⁸ Even though Mack's theory has its weaknesses, it still offers a unique view on why weak actors win over its stronger adversaries.

1.4 STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

The fourth chosen theory is in our point of view the most comprehensive and broad one. This theory or the argument of strategic interaction was made by I. Toft and is based on the Mack's theory of interest asymmetry. I. Toft states, that actors come to the conflict with 3 things:

1. with a resources, which are immediately available to fight with relative to those of a potential adversary,
2. with a plan for the use of those resources in pursuit of a specified objective or strategy and
3. with resource potentially available once the battle has been joined (ones again relative to potential adversary's).

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ MEROM, G. 2012. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. 2012. p. 21, 310 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0521008778.

According to I Toft, addition to knowledge of each actor's available resources explaining outcomes demand and estimate of consequences of the interaction of each opponent's strategy.¹⁹ These approaches are further divided into categories which present those used by the weak opponent and those used by the strong party. As for the strong actor strategies, there is used direct approach as conventional attack and indirect approach as barbarism. Defense strategies or the weak actor strategies are conventional defense as direct approach and guerrilla warfare strategy as an indirect approach. Only way how the weak can win the war is to apply an opposite strategy to the strategy which uses the strong party in conflict. In the other words, if the strong actor will use the conventional attack, the weak actor has to use the guerrilla warfare strategy. Of course, as the other theories, even the theory of Tofts' has its critiques. Main criticism of this theory was made by M. Belfer. T. Belfer argues that tactics, not strategy, is the key for the weak to win the war. Further, in his opinion, other aspects are important in conflict – objectives, strategies, and tactics. Each of these aspects are then dependent on the previous one. If we could state an example, Iran is the hegemony power over the region in the Middle East. Its strategy is to acquire WMD and being superior in potential asymmetric warfare, to obtain the know-how of the WMD and scientists that have the know-how. I. Toft in his work states, that for example M. Ali won the match against G. Foreman by the strategy he used. T. Belfer argues that M. Ali won because of his superior tactics, not strategy. Ali has according to T. Belfer only one objective – to win. His strategy was to make G. Foreman tired, but the most important part were tactics – dancing around and taunting Foreman for a long time. I. Toft presents that strategy is more powerful than power, but T. Belfer states that that combination of power and intelligence is most important. Although strategic interaction theory has its downsides, in our opinion, this theory can describe the outcome of asymmetric conflict, because research of I. Toft is mainly narrowly focused on political/military conflict outcome.

2. OUTCOME OF THE THEORY ANALYZES

If we apply the chosen theories on the Soviet – Mujahedeen War and NATO - Taliban War, we can try to provide some outcome of the theories based on the reality of these asymmetric conflicts. The outcome of the Soviet war against the mujahedeen is mainly clear. The mujahedeen won because the Soviets were unable to either destroy the mujahedeen or to control the country to the limit, where the guerilla forces would seize to exist. After three

¹⁹ ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict“. In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

years after their withdrawal from Afghanistan, Soviet regime collapsed, and Afghanistan became controlled by the guerilla forces which later on transformed into the Taliban. Although the outcome of the NATO – Taliban war is officially declared as victory, despite many achievements, the victory of this asymmetric conflict lies on the side of the Taliban. Even though, U. S. just alone put around 700 billion dollars into this conflict, they were unable to wholly defeat Taliban or to create a secure and stable country.

When we apply the logic of Gilpin's power transition theory, but he Taliban and also mujahedeen should have, over time, surpassed their opponents, in terms of relative power. This would lead them to their victory. However, in terms of relative power, this is not a case of either way. Although the mujahedeen did obtain Stingers and new weapons, they did not pose a severe threat to the Soviet regime. The same can be apply to the US fail against the Taliban. Even if we take into account the 9/11, it is not possible to assume, that the Taliban has endangered the US existence at any given time. Furthermore, unlike the Soviets, the Americans did not suffer from any economic decline. U. S. did not also experience any major reductions in their military capabilities. This theory is thus not applicable to these chosen conflicts – asymmetric conflicts. Even though, the theory theoretically assumes that it can describe and analyze outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, when we shortly overlook the Afghans wars, we cannot confirm this thesis.

The outcome of the analyzes of the nature of the actor theory is going to be the same. Although, Soviet Union was clearly an authoritarian regime, there was not the victory on the end of the war for the country. When Gorbachev took the power after the Brezhnev, the country began to shift to another direction. The interior and foreign policy started to change and the war in Afghanistan did not fit into Gorbachev's plans. As R. H. Magnus stated: "It (the war) did not fit into Gorbachev's overall policy of glasnost and perestroika. He felt that it had turned into a debacle for the Soviet Union and was too closely associated with the policies of the Brezhnev era and the renewed Cold War. Glasnost meant that it was no longer possible to keep the price of the war a secret."²⁰ In this stage of development in Soviet Union, the Soviet doctrine shifted from the use of barbarism, into a standard COIN strategy. In case of NATO war against the Taliban, the shift of presidential office caused the troop withdrawal, not a regime change. The U. S. reduced their use of barbarism (represented by CIA torture) after the shift of presidential candidates and applied COIN strategy thanks to the new general

²⁰ MAGNUS, R. H. – E. NABY. 1997. *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*. Boulder: CO: Westview Press. 1997. 288 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0865315136

in command. Neither of these changes though had nothing to do with a shift of the U. S. Policy towards authoritarian regime. In our point of view, both the USSR and the U. S. fail in Afghanistan presents, that authoritarian and also democratic strong actors share roughly equal political vulnerability in a prolonged asymmetric conflict. The one fact is clear, both regimes and various strategies which were used by them had no effect on winning or losing the war, despite being many times stronger than their opponent.

During application of interest asymmetry theory on asymmetric conflicts, there is important to identify the relative interests of each actor. In both research wars, the relative interests of mujahedeen as well as the Taliban had the highest interest possible – their own survival. The USSR are today very difficult to define. Firstly, the Soviets invaded the country with minimal objectives, and were focusing on the stabilization of a neighboring country within their sphere of influence. Once stabilized, the Soviet would leave the country and enjoy the new Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Their invasion though triggered an aggressive response, delegitimizing Kabul's regime beyond repair. Of course, it can be said, that Soviets also underestimated DRA's inability to act on their own. Meanwhile, they did not bring more of the units and tried to stabilize the country in order to avoid international humiliation. On the end, of course, they would fear of domino effect among other communist regimes. The interest of Soviets in our opinion after while changed and developed. After the interest to stabilize the country and regime, it started to be about developing their military strategies in order to win and end the conflict. When they left the country, they could keep it alive for next two years. The answer if the actors' relative interests may influence the outcome of asymmetric conflict is in this case very mixed and unclear.

In the case of the war between NATO (mainly U.S.) and Taliban, the interests also shifted over time. At the beginning, American interests were extremely high – due to the outcome of 9/11. Quick invasion was also quickly transformed into a decisive victory. In 2003, U.S. shifted its interest between Afghanistan and Iraq. For the presidency of J. Bush, the Iraq became more important than Afghanistan. This also quickly changed after president Obama took the office in White House. He very promptly announced the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, planned for the end of 2014. This clearly showed limited relative interest of Americans in the conflict. In this case, we can confirm, that actors' relative interests may influence the outcome of asymmetric conflict.

The last theory which was part of our scientific analyze – strategic interaction theory by I. Toft, presented main interaction between two actors in conflict. The Soviet – Afghan

war had two main strategic interactions. After Soviets invaded Afghanistan, both side were relatively unprepared for the war. The Soviet had no helicopter support and with the tanks only, there were absolutely not prepared against the mujahedeen guerilla warfare. I. Toft presented that, “they (Soviets) swung a blunt club, and the mujahedeen ducked and stabbed them in the foot with a sharp stick.”²¹ The Soviets of course switched to other strategy – barbarism as a form of COIN strategy. Under the strategic interaction theory, this should have been the key how to defeat the mujahedeen, but eventually this premises failed. Even though, there is no doubt, that Soviets damaged Massud’s forces by destructing the infrastructure and also by targeting the non-combatants, on the other hand, they further alienated the population and thus brought more fighters to guerilla warfare. As we can see, this case study would be unclear, because of different elements which were brought to the conflict and its analysis on behalf of strategic interaction theory. If we analyze the second conflict, there is a different interaction to look on. During the ISAF invasion in 2001, the war was led by direct strategy against direct strategic interaction and the Taliban has lost decisively. Because the president Bush’s administration started to focus on Iraq, it allowed the Taliban to reorganize and began to apply guerilla warfare strategy. After that, American responded by turning to the COIN strategy. They focused on training and preparing the withdrawal. In this situation, Taliban realized, that only thing that was needed was sit and wait. Thus, they had to continue to fight their holly war to some extent, which was supported by questionable support by Pakistan and also by the ISI. There is still not open information about how much support the Taliban got from Pakistan and how much of the support was provided by its own illicit activities. Regarding to the interaction strategic theory, the first stage of Operation Enduring Freedom proves, that when strong actor attacks by direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, with all other variables being equal, strong party to conflict wins quickly and decisively. In the mist of conflict, the USSR and also U.S. used barbarism and COIN strategy and though, both countries should win against guerilla warfare. However, no such thing happened. As we can see, even I. Toft’s theory, although complex and wide in its premises, did not support outcomes of asymmetric conflicts fully.

CONCLUSION

As we could show by chosen theories, there are many possible reasons why weak actors may defeat the stronger opponent in asymmetric conflict. There is possibility of

²¹ ARREGUÍN-TOFT, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict“. In *International Security* 26.1, pp. 93 – 128, 2001. ISSN 1531-4804.

political vulnerability of strong party, their time as superpowers may be over or they would be defeated due to a worse strategy chosen. The weak opponent on the other side struggle with lower numbers, military capacities even survival itself. Despite what many claims, there is no verification, that stronger party loses more than weaker parties in conflicts. Although, what we have to claim is fact, that while in the past, the country with more relative power – bigger army, more population (soldiers) and resources, was almost certainly the victor. Nowadays, the weaker opponents use unconventional methods in order to even these scales. As we confirmed, theory and practice situation proved, that state regime type hardly matters in asymmetric conflicts. Both democracies and authoritarian regimes are capable of barbarism, torture, war crimes and fabrication of information. Both regimes – USSR and U.S. in time of conflicts have roughly equal political vulnerability in prolonged asymmetric conflicts. Also, there is very unlikely that power transition in the international arena would have an excessive effect on the outcome of asymmetric conflicts. Even though, we could not clearly prove premises of interest asymmetry theory represented by A. Mack in Afghan scenario, it definitely had an impact on the outcome of the conflict. If the mujahedeen were not afraid for their survival, it is highly unlikely, that they would be able to withstand the combination of massive depopulation and constant aerial bombing.

As we can see, there is no universal theory, which can describe and prove outcomes of the asymmetric conflicts. In our point of view, there is rather a combination of the factors, which are brought by different theories which present how the weak can win the war against stronger opponent. As we already proven, strategy can be important, but without a support among the local population or foreign assistance, the weak has a very low chance to succeed. The analysis of the theories, which could answer the question – why the weak win the war, bring many theoretically and practically interesting outcomes. Although, there was no ambition to provide analysis of all or even the complex analysis of those theories in this paper, we believe, that it showed many premises which should be defined and researched even further.

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HUNGARY: JOINING THE ALLIANCE – 20 YEARS OF MEMBERSHIP

Klára SIPOSNÉ KECSKEMÉTHY

ABSTRACT

2019 is a year of remarkable anniversaries. We celebrate the 20th anniversary of Hungary's membership in NATO, the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue, and the 15th anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The study provides an overview of Hungary's joining the Alliance, the evolution of the NATO–Hungary relationship, from the first contact until the achievement of full NATO membership, the development of NATO–Hungarian relationship between 1990–1999, the establishment of the Partnership and Peace initiative, and its practical and theoretical role in Hungary's preparation, and the preparatory steps for our country's NATO membership.

Keywords: NATO membership, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, referendum, Hungarian Defense Forces

INTRODUCTION

The political and economic regime changes in Central and Eastern Europe transformed the relations of the countries with their former opponents and each other. A slow process of confidence-building and reconciliation began between previous adversaries, and NATO sought partnership with former socialist countries. Partnership for Peace Initiative introduced a new security philosophy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. The knowledge and practical experience gained during the cooperation played a decisive role in Hungary's meeting the expectations and achieving a minimum level of compatibility and interoperability for NATO membership.

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1990–1999

Hungary actively seized the historic opportunity, after the change of the regime, foreign policy strategic objectives were formulated, one of which was integration into European processes and the earliest possible accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO, EU). Contact was established in 1990, the relations between Hungary and NATO

began with mutual visits by political leaders. As a first step in this process, on 29 June 1990, Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky visited Brussels. He was the first Warsaw Pact politician who visited the Brussels NATO HQ. On 18 July 1990, the meeting of Prime Minister József Antall with the NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in Brussels was of historic significance. He was the first Prime Minister of a member state of the still existing Warsaw Pact who entered the NATO headquarters.¹ On 22 November 1990, Manfred Wörner arrived in Budapest. That was the first time when a Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had visited Hungary. He praised the crucial role of Hungary in the political changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, and called the Alliance an essential supporting pillar of European security.²

In the autumn of 1990, contact was established between the North Atlantic Assembly (since 1999, NATO Parliamentary Assembly). The meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 28 October 1991, to which Prime Minister József Antall was invited, was another milestone. In his speech, he urged NATO member states to pay more attention to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and to institutionalize their relations with these countries.³ At the Rome Summit in 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),⁴ – which provided a forum for consultation for all former socialist countries – was founded, and Hungary became one of the founding members.⁵

The 1990 London and 1991 Copenhagen declarations of NATO called for establishing military relations with the Central and Eastern European countries. On 30 October 1991, General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) visited Hungary. This event opened the way to visits by Hungarian military leaders. The official visit by Hungarian Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant-General János Deák to Brussels on 26 January 1992, marked the beginning of working relations between Hungarian military leaders and their NATO counterparts. On 1 April 1992, Defence Minister Lajos Für attended the first joint meeting of Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Brussels to discuss the main directions and possibilities of the institutionalization of military

¹ PIETSCH, L. 1998. *Magyarország és a NATO.[Hungary and NATO]*. Magyar Atlanti Tanács, Budapest, 1998.

² SZENES, Z.–SIPOSNÉ KECSKEMÉTHY K. 2019. *NATO 4.0 and Hungary; 20 years of membership, 30 years of cooperation*, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, p. 487. ISBN 978 963 327 770 6

³ A NATO – az európai stabilitás záloga.[NATO as the key to European stability]. [online].cit. 2018-10-05]. Available at: <https://antalljozsef.igytortent.hu/beszedekek/politikai-beszedekek-interjuk/182-a-nato-az-europai-stabilitas-zaloga.html>

⁴ *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, 8 November 1991. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-28]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm>

⁵ *North Atlantic Cooperation Council*, [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm

cooperation. On 2 May 1992, General Kálmán Lőrincz, Commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces visited Brussels.

On July 16 1992, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner arrived in Budapest again. The civil war in Yugoslavia and its impact on Hungary and the security of the Central European region received great attention at the negotiations. Manfred Wörner emphasized that NATO paid special attention to Hungary because of the country's political and geographical situation. He also emphasized that NATO regards the situation of ethnic minorities as a dangerous, destabilizing factor in the region, and is therefore interested in the proper introduction of European standards.⁶ On 19 January 1993, General James B. Davis, Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Major General James D. Logeman, Commander of NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF), conducted negotiations in Budapest. An agreement was signed according to which Hungary made available its airspace for the AWACS flights to monitor violations of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia.

On 17 May 1993, Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky paid a visit to Brussels, and the central topic of the talks was the Yugoslav crisis. On 3 December 1993, the Hungarian foreign minister participated at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Brussels, where the concept of a new Partnership for Peace (PfP) was discussed. The adoption of the Partnership for Peace program at the NATO Summit in Brussels on 10–11 January 1994 was a historic step. The basic idea behind the Partnership for Peace was that each European state has responsibility for guaranteeing the security of the continent and peaceful coexistence of its peoples.⁷ Although at that time, the program did not include the preparation of countries joining the initiative for NATO accession, it launched this process by widening the scope of political and military cooperation. Through different forms of cooperation, the Central and Eastern European countries had a real opportunity to prepare for membership (The history of the development of NATO-Hungarian relations is shown in the Table 1).

⁶ BOMBAY, L. (ed.) A honvédelem négy éve 1990-1994. [Four years of national defence 1990-1994]. 1994. p. 25–27.

⁷ *The Brussels Summit Declaration*, 1994. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease

Table 1 Overview the development of NATO-Hungarian relations between 1990–1999 ⁸

(Edited by Col. Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy)

Date	Event	Significance
29 June 1990	Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky's visit to Brussels	The first official contact was made with NATO
18 July 1990	Prime Minister József Antall's visit to Brussels	The first Warsaw Pact PM at NATO HQ.
22 November 1990	Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary General's visit to Budapest	The first time visit of NATO SecGen to Budapest.
Autumn 1990	First contact with the North Atlantic Assembly	The first official contact was made with NAA
28 October 1991	József Antall's speech at the NAC meeting	Milestone in NATO-Hungarian relationship
17 May 1993	Géza Jeszenszky paid a visit to Brussels	Intensified relationship
February 8, 1994	Hungary joined the Partnership for the Peace Program	Turning point in NATO-Hungarian relationship
January 1995	Establishment of the NATO Liaison Office in Brussels	Official contact was established
29 January 1996	Hungary announced its intention to join NATO	Hungary was the first among formal WP countries
8–9 July 1997	Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland was invited to join the Alliance	First post-cold war enlargement of the Alliance
12 March 1999	Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland achieved full membership in the Alliance	Three former Warsaw Pact countries joined the Alliance

2. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE

„The Partnership is one of the best investments ever for a future safer world.”⁹

In January 1994, NATO invited the countries involved in the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to join the PfP. The document was signed by Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky on 8 February 1994.¹⁰ The signing of the PfP Framework Document was subsequently ratified by a parliamentary resolution in December 1994.¹¹ In the framework of PfP, NATO and individual partner countries have developed forms of cooperation that best match the

⁸ SZENES, Z. –SIPOSNÉ KECSKEMÉTHY, K. 2019. *NATO 4.0 and Hungary*. Ibid p. 204–209.

⁹ Lord Robertson's farewell speech. NATO HQ, Brussels, 17 December 2003. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031217a.htm>

¹⁰ NATO Handbook. Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001.

¹¹ 66/1994 (XII. 15.) OGY határozat az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezetével aláírt „Békepartnerség” program keretdokumentumának megerősítéséről. [Parliamentary resolution 66/1994 (15/12) on the ratification of PfP Framework Document]

individual capabilities of a given partner country. Adopting the program and participating in it was the beginning of a learning process for Hungary, pursuing the goal of NATO accession. An important objective of the Partnership Program was to facilitate the modernization of the partner countries' armed forces and the development of capabilities and readiness forces that could contribute to the success of NATO-led search and rescue, humanitarian, and peace support operations under UN or OSCE mandate. Joining the initiative, the Hungarian government declared forces and equipment of the Hungarian Defence Forces to attain the objectives, and in the framework of the cooperation, allowed the use of Hungarian training grounds as well as training and other installations.

In January 1995, the Atlantic Liaison Office was established to coordinate NATO-related tasks, headed by András Simonyi, who served as a diplomatic representative in ambassador status. The office was supported by the Partnership Liaison Office, established at the SHAPE in Mons.¹² In the autumn 1995, a Euro-Atlantic Integration Working Group was set up within the Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff, tasked with preparing the integration the national adoption of NATO's most important procedures, regulations, standards, principles of the use of force, and the coordination of PfP-related activities.

The knowledge and practical experience gained during the cooperation played a decisive role in Hungary's meeting the expectations and achieving a minimum level of compatibility and interoperability for NATO membership in a short time. The Hungarian military became familiar with the functioning and the defence planning system of NATO, made significant progress in creating transparency in the planning of defence budgets and in ensuring democratic control of the armed forces. The PfP has provided a very important practical framework for building confidence and relations among the Hungarian Defence Forces and the armies of the NATO countries.

Hungary and the Hungarian Defence Forces actively and successfully utilised the learning process provided by the PfP, which played an important role in the country's being invited to join NATO in the first round of enlargement. Because the partnership was initially aimed at creating and maintaining military capabilities that enabled countries to actively participate in the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and search and rescue operations of the Alliance, the partner countries could demonstrate their commitment and contribute to

¹² SZENES, Z.–OROSZ, Z. Előretolt brüsszeli helyőrség. 20 éves az MH Katonai Képviselő Hivatala.[Forward base in Brussels – Twenty years of the HDF Military Representative Office] *Honvédségi Szemle*. 2018. 5. szám, pp. 3–16.

managing conflicts at hot spots. The partnership impacted on Alliance policy and military capabilities, as a number of “niche” capabilities – strategic airlift capability, bridging capability, water purification, medical contingent, CBRN defence, knowledge of Slavic cultures, – were integrated into joint activities, missions and NATO operations.¹³

Hungary, together with the Czech Republic and Poland, was invited to the Madrid NATO Summit held on 8–9 July 1997. *“Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999.”*¹⁴ The Heads of Government of the three invited countries called the invitation *“a historic decision paving the way to a more stable and secure Europe”*.¹⁵

Ambassador András Simonyi presented his credentials to then-NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on 8 October 1997.¹⁶ The Atlantic Liaison Office was transformed into the Office of Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹⁷ As part of the NATO mission, on 15 January 1998, the Office of Military Representative of the Hungarian Defence Forces was established as a budgetary institution operating alongside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to facilitate the management of accession tasks for the Republic of Hungary (See Table 1).

3. PREPARATION FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

At the time of the declaration of its political intent to achieve NATO membership, the Hungarian Defence Forces were not yet ready to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The period between 1990 and 1994 can be regarded as the initial stage of preparation for NATO membership. That was the time when political decisions were made for the establishment of an independent defence force, the new principles of security policy and national defence were formulated, the Constitution was amended, the Defence Act was

¹³ SIPOSNÉ KECSKEMÉTHY, K. A Szövetség partnerkapcsolatainak áttekintése a rigai csúcstalálkozó fényében, [An overview of the Alliance’s partnership in the light of the Riga Summit]. In *Hadtudomány*. 2006. 4. szám. pp. 66–70.

¹⁴ *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation 8 July 1997*. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>

¹⁵ *Joint Press Conference following the NATO Summit Meeting*. 8 July 1997. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970708h.htm>

¹⁶ GÖRÖG, I. (ed.): *We are NATO*, Mondat Kft, 2018. p. 36; JOÓ, Rudolf (ed.) *A NATO-tag Magyarország*. [Hungary, a NATO member]. Magyar Köztársaság Külügyminisztériuma, Budapest, 1999. p. 109.

¹⁷ *Decision 2280/1997 (08/09) by the Government of the Republic of Hungary*

adopted, the time of compulsory military service was reduced to 12 months,¹⁸ unarmed and civil service were introduced, and the military chaplains commenced their activity. Creating the national image of the Hungarian Defence Forces was an important task: new uniforms were introduced, a system of symbols corresponding to national traditions was developed, and the traditions of military units got revived. On 15 March 1990, the Hungarian military was renamed as Hungarian Defence Forces.¹⁹

The events of the mid-1990s can be considered an important milestone in the preparation of Hungary for NATO membership and in the transformation of the military. In 1995, Parliament determined the character, size and tasks of the military forces necessary for the defence of the country. Hungary developed its own individual programs, planned the activities and the assets for their implementation in line with the ambitions and capacities, which were submitted to NATO in Presentation Documents (PD). On 6 June 1994, our country handed over the Hungarian PD to NATO.

On 15 November 1994, the Individual Partnership Program (IPP) determining direct co-operation between NATO and Hungary was adopted. Its most significant fields were as follows: civilian control of the armed forces, defence planning, airspace management/control, defence procurements, logistics and standardization, interoperability, education and training, and the participation of the Hungarian Defence Forces in NATO/PfP exercises. In the framework of the IPP, the implementation of the PfP program included 9–12 exercises annually.²⁰ The participation in exercises facilitated the understanding of NATO's planning process and tactical procedures, and also provided an opportunity to practice cooperation between staffs.²¹ Both the MoD and the HDF delegated experts to the NATO HQ (Brussels) and to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), which was set up in Mons to facilitate continuous military-to-military cooperation. Joining the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) was an important milestone along Hungary's road to NATO membership. The purpose of the PARP was to create the conditions for military cooperation with NATO for the implementation of joint peacekeeping and other non-Article 5 operations.²²

¹⁸ *Act CX of 1993 on national defence*

¹⁹ VÉGH, F. A Magyar Honvédség a felkészüléstől a teljes interoperabilitásig. [The Hungarian Defence Force from preparation to complete interoperability]. In Joó Rudolf (ed.) 1998. Ibid pp. 39–46.

²⁰ *MoD decree 28/1993 (HK 16) on the planning, organisation, and implementation of defence tasks of the Republic of Hungary in the Partnership for Peace program of NATO.*

²¹ VÉGH, F.: Vég(h)elszámolás. A korszakváltás katonája. [Winding-up – Soldier of changing ages]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest. 2014. p. 471.

²² SZENES, Z. –SIPOS KECSKEMÉTHY, K.: *NATO 4.0 and Hungary*. 2019. Ibid p. 227

To prepare for NATO membership, teaching English language also became an important task. For the NATO accession, the Target Force Goals (TFG) gave priority to having proficiency in English for personnel of the Hungarian Defence Forces. In order to achieve the goal on 10 April 1995, the MoD established the NATO Partnership for Peace Military Language Training Centre (NATO PfP MLTC) in Budapest.

One of the military-technical conditions of the accession was to reach minimum compatibility with the armed forces of NATO member states. In the field of technical cooperation, NATO did not expect from Hungary the immediate and full replacement of its military assets and equipment, but the order of priority was identified and the most important preparatory tasks were determined. Due to Hungary's geostrategic position, the replacement of the air defence assets was a priority, to be completed by the accession. Airspace control systems had to be modernized, modern airspace sovereignty, airspace management and radar systems were required.²³ The most important technical projects were launched to fulfil NATO's standardisation agreements. In Veszprém, the NATO-compatible integrated Airspace Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC) was established, and the procurement of Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) system began. In December 1995, at NATO's request, the National Assembly endorsed the transit and temporary stationing of IFOR forces in Hungary to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.²⁴ In the same month, the Hungarian Engineer Contingent (with limited strength, not more than 500 personnel) was declared to the international peacekeeping operation.²⁵

The enhanced Partnership for Peace program focused on the military aspects of preparation for NATO membership in the candidate countries. Stricter requirements were formulated for strengthening democratic control over the armed forces, for defence planning, transparency of budgeting procedures, for the development of a force structure and capabilities appropriate to the security environment, for planning peacekeeping, humanitarian and search and rescue activities, and for strengthening cooperation. Because of the significance of the accession, the Parliament decided to call a ratification referendum. The question was: "Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should join NATO to secure the

²³ GAZDAG, F.: A magyar külpolitika 1989–2014. [The Hungarian foreign policy 1989–2014]. Budapest. 2014. p. 136.

²⁴ *Parliamentary resolution 112/1995 (02/12) on the transit and temporary stationing across and in Hungary of the Implementation Forces (IFOR)*

²⁵ *Parliamentary resolution 114/1995 (12/12) on the involvement of the limited Hungarian Engineer Contingent in the framework of IFOR*

country's defences? The number of yes votes was 3,344,131, which is 85.33% (see Figure 1).²⁶




Figure 1 The result of the November 16, 1997 referendum²⁷

On 17 November Hungary sent a letter of intent on the country's NATO accession, which was handed over to then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Ambassador András Simonyi. In December 1997, the then 16 member states of NATO signed the accession protocols, so that the ratification procedure could be launched, during which the given treaty was put to referendum or parliamentary voting in each member state. This procedure was successfully completed in December 1998.

Following the Madrid Summit, negotiations started with Hungary on military, economic, financial and organizational policy issues. On 10 September 1997, the first round of Hungary's NATO accession talks was held in Brussels.²⁸ The obligatory defence spending of Hungary was determined, and the circumstances and conditions of the deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the capability requirements and the strength required for the assigned forces were precisely identified. With regard to financial issues, the parties agreed that the Hungarian contribution to NATO's common costs would be 0.65% of the current

²⁶ On the outcome of the referendum on 16 November 1997. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <http://portal.valasztas.hu/nep97/index.htm>

²⁷ Népszavazás Magyarország NATO csatlakozásáról.[Referendum on Hungary's accession to NATO] [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/y5ax8rh2>

²⁸ JOÓ Rudolf (ed.) Ibid pp. 104–110.

national defence budget. Today, it is obvious that Hungary significantly overcommitted itself, and some of the declared forces do not even today meet Alliance standards. During the preparations for NATO membership, the start of the transformation of the conscription-based military force into a mixed system of volunteers and conscripts was a significant development. Already in the period of the Partnership for Peace program, the Ministry of Defence was involved in NATO's defence planning system, completed the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), and undertook the development of Target Force Goals (TFG). On 3 October 1997, a representative of Hungary submitted the DPQ at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. A political decision was made that Hungary would join NATO's Southern Flank, commanded by the Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). In September 1998, the leadership of the Alliance further restricted the set of the most important preparatory tasks and required Minimum Military Requirements (MMRs) to be fulfilled before the accession. The most important things to be achieved included the integration of Hungary's air defence into the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), the preparation of the assigned forces, the creation of conditions for information security (INFOSEC), and the assignment of personnel to NATO posts.²⁹ By meeting the MMRs, Hungary became eligible for full membership.³⁰

In his parliamentary speech, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stressed that *“When Hungary joined NATO, it did not merely join a military organization, an aggregate of power, but most of all, and above all, a community of values. These values have always been close to us, they are the most beloved ones among the all-time organizing principles of Hungarian societies – such as freedom, and the value of the responsibility necessarily associated with freedom.”*³¹

12 March 1999 saw one of the greatest successes of Hungary in the 20th century: NATO membership. Foreign Minister János Martonyi deposited the Protocol of Accession of Hungary in Independence, Missouri State (USA). In his speech at the accession ceremony, he emphasized that *“we, Hungarians, made this decision on our own, free from any outside inter-*

²⁹ SZENES, Z. A NATO-csatlakozás katonai feladatai. [The military tasks relating to NATO accession]. In Glatz Ferenc (szerk.): A NATO és a magyar politika. [NATO and Hungarian politics]. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest, 1999. pp 73–98.

³⁰ VÉGH, F. Magyar Honvédség 1991–2017. [Hungarian Defence Forces]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. Ibid. p. 475.

³¹ Speech on 22 March 1999 session of the National Assembly, [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <https://tinyurl.com/y64y7ufq>

*ference. We applied for joining NATO, the largest network of security that history has ever known.*³²

In 1999 Hungary was the forward base of the Alliance, a “*NATO island*”, bordering with partner countries (Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania) and the Balkan countries, the successor states of the disintegrated Yugoslavia. After the turn of the millennium, Hungary ceased to be a “*NATO island*” or a “*forward base*”. The first round of the post Cold War enlargement was followed by the so-called Big Boom, in late March 2004, the Alliance expanded with seven countries at the Istanbul Summit. The accession of the three neighbouring countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania) fundamentally influenced Hungary’s security policy (see Figure 2).

Among the neighbouring countries, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia are members of the Alliance; Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria are EU member states, Ukraine is a key strategic partner of the Alliance, and Serbia, a key country in the direct region of Hungary is a member of the Partnership for Peace program.



Figure 2 Hungary’s neighbours³³

³² Speech by Dr. Janos Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, at the deposition of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession Hungary. 12 March 1999. [online]. [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312c.htm>

³³ Map of Central Europe, [cit. 2019-07-05]. Available at: http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/txu-oclc-247233313-europe_pol_2008.jpg

CONCLUSION

After the political and economic regime change a slow confidence-building process and reconciliation began between previous adversaries, and NATO sought partnership with former socialist countries, including Hungary. The study described the evolution of the NATO-Hungary relationship (mutual official visits, joining the PfP Initiative, establishment of the NATO Liaison Office in Brussels, announcement and invitation to join NATO etc.) from the first contact until the achievement of full NATO membership on 12 March 1999. The Partnership for Peace Initiative introduced a new security philosophy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. The knowledge and practical experience gained during the cooperation played a decisive role in Hungary's meeting the expectations and achieving a minimum level of compatibility and interoperability for NATO membership.

In 1999, Hungary joined NATO as defined in Article 5. The Alliance as a regional political-military alliance has gradually become a global player in the past decades. In the 21st century, the Hungarian Defense Forces effectively contributes to the national security interests of our country. The main task of the Hungarian Defense Forces is to protect Hungary's autonomy and territorial integrity; the effective implementation of the country defense tasks defined in the Fundamental Law, the contribution to the collective defense of NATO and the Alliance's operations; active participation in international peace support, crisis response, counter-terrorism and humanitarian missions of international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE).³⁴ Joining the most powerful political and military organization was one of the greatest successes of Hungary in the 20th century.

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³⁴ ISASZEGI, János–RAVASZ, István: A magyar haderő 1990-től napjainkig. [The Hungarian Defence Forces from 1990 to the present]. pp. 227–289. In: Hermann Róbert (ed.) *Kis magyar hadtörténet*. [Little Hungarian military history]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2018.

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EUROMAIDAN: THE ROUTE TO THE CRIMEAN CRISIS THAT WENT THROUGH ONLINE

Tamás KOVÁCS

ABSTRACT

In 2014, the protest in Ukraine in the Maidan Nezalezhnosti or the so-called Independence Square caused significant changes in the life of the Eastern European country. Undoubtedly the most significant result was the removal of Viktor Yanukovich from his office, that showed an increasingly authoritarian presidency. However, despite the ousting of Yanukovich, the events in Kyiv were soon followed by the Crimean crisis and pro-Russian unrest in Eastern Ukraine, that lead a severe separatist movement and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and Russian military intervention in the territory. Seemingly it was a classical military operation, however, the practice which lead the loss of Crimea was not without precedent. The aim of this article to give a general overview of the context of case and effect-series, in which the internet had an important role.

Keywords: Euromaidan, Russia, fake accounts, Moldova, unrest

INTRODUCTION

The Euromaidan started on the evening of 21 November 2013 with a demonstration in the Independence Square, Kyiv and a few months later evolved into the Ukrainian revolution. The civil unrest started shortly after that the Ukrainian administration with the lead of President Viktor Yanukovich decided to discontinue the partnership agreement parleys with the EU, and they started to prefer the Russian-oriented Eurasian Economic Union. After the announcement, the range of the demonstrations quickly extended, with requests for the withdrawal of the presidency of President Viktor Yanukovich and his administration. The extensive state corruption, violations against human rights also all fueled the civil unrest. The situation escalated after the police brutality against the demonstrators on 30 November, that lead to several further demonstrators joining, slowly directing the events into to a revolution in 2014.

The Ukrainian revolution was not an isolated demonstration rather a partly artificially directed event-series that assisted the Russian administration to gain control over Crimea. The Russian foreign policy seeks to confront the standards of the international system through performing a new political tactics that use intimidation in order to stop the eastward extension of the NATO and the European Union. However, the first sign of this policy started much earlier in Moldovan Transnistria, where Russia acted as the protector of the Russian-speaking minority. This essay is going to give an overview of the Russian policy that led to the annexation of the Crimea. In the first part of this paper I am examining the status and endless struggle of the Transnistrian state, then I am discussing the transformation of the post-Soviet media, finally, in the last part of this essay, I will give some example how Russia adapted his Moldavian experiences into Ukraine.

1. MOLDOVA AS A PRELIMINARY EXPERIENCE

By nature, post-Soviet states bordering Russia, such as Ukraine or Moldova contain ethnically Russian or Russian-speaking populations. According to the latest census, at about 17% of the population of Ukraine has Russian ethnicity, while in Moldova this ratio is the half of the Ukrainian. As stated in the Russian law, those local citizens who are residing outside the home country forming a category, that should be guarded by the Russian state. Therefore, within the post-Soviet states any breakaway attempts, both separatists and their Russian allies that have tried to create a sense of standing under siege from the side of the post-Soviet country, creating a status for Russia's intervention as a protector of minority rights. As a consequence, the mother country intervenes on behalf of those Russians who are living in the breakaway provinces. Moreover, this act could assist Russia's purpose of restoring the sphere of authority which was lost in the 1990s.¹

Following the Euromaidan demonstrations that ousted the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, pro-Russian separatists took over the Crimea. However, the earliest experiment using this technique happened more than two decades prior to the Euromaidan in Transnistria, Moldova, where a brief conflict with Moldova in 1992 resulted in a tenuous peace agreement signed under duress and guaranteed by the Russian military. The Russian-speaking local citizens of all nationalities, including Russians, Moldovans or Ukrainians, have applied the idea of a threat from a common enemy represented by the Moldovan state. Therefore, the Transnistrian state was symbolically formed by constantly reiterating the damages and the

1 ZVELOV, I. Russia's Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union, s. 49–62.

casualties inflicted by the Moldovan state on the Russian-speaking population in the territory of Transnistria during the 1992 war.²

The image of the protector of their own minority's rights seemed gentle and suitable for the Russian administration until 2008 when a new threat emerged on the scene. Several post-Soviet states, including Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, made progress to join the European Union or NATO. However, fatigued by its prompt eastern extension in 2004 and being careful of offending Russia, the EU rejected to propose these counties a Membership Action Plan, which would have provided them a smooth way of entering. Alternatively, the EU proposed them Association Agreements, which established tariff-free imports and visa-free travel. However, these agreements did not create definitive steps providing EU membership.³ For Russia, these negotiation discussions and preliminary agreements created risk because they carried the EU and its military up direct to its frontiers. To counter this intimidation, Russia under the appearance of guarding the rights of Russian-language speakers, sponsoring separatism through political aid and even equipment to unregularly armies in the separatist territory.⁴

A year later, another threat became obvious for the Russian administration. The rapid diffusion of social networking had strong effect on the foreign interest of Russia which became visible on 6 April 2009, when a protest series emerged against the parliamentary election results in major cities of Moldova. The demonstrators declared that approximately 49.48% of all of the votes, that recognized Russia oriented Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) as winner of the elections in majority were fake, and demanded the recount of the votes, the announcement of new election or the resignation of the PCRM administration. The first demonstration that began in Chişinău on 6 April 2009, was organized through Twitter by a 25-year-old Moldovan journalist Natalia Morar. On the next day, the number of the demonstrators already reached over ten thousand, and most of them were young mostly university students and, gathering in the city center on Ştefan cel Mare boulevard.⁵

The demonstration against the PCRM brought the Russian intentions to the surface again when Igor Smirnov, the first president of the internationally unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic blamed the Moldovan government of neglecting to defend

2 BOBICK, M. Profits of Disorder: Images of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, s. 244–245.

3 ASMUS, R. The Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia.

4 DUNN, E. C. & BOBICK, M. The empire strikes back, s. 406–407.

5 HADING, L. Moldova claims Romania plotted attempted coup.

Transdnistrians from the nationalist protesters. Smirnov began his career as a leader of the OSTK on a regional level as Transnistrian politician worked towards the independence from the Moldovan SSR in the summer of 1990. When their first committee created a self-contained Transnistrian economic zone in June, Smirnov was chosen as the chair of a coordinating council charged to make steps towards to the independence. Later he became the president of the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR). As the conflict frequently became violent at the end of 1991 Smirnov successfully collaborated with the nearby posted Red Army unit; who gave to the PMR separatist weapons and munitions; moreover, several Red Army soldiers attached themselves to the PMR Army.⁶ Overall, Smirnov worked to gain recognition for the state.

After the demonstrations, the political climate in the country became polarized. A clear sign of this was that the parliament failed to elect a new president, therefore, the parliament dissolved itself and announced snap elections on 29 July. Even though the PCRM won the polls with 44.7% of the vote which gave them 48 MPs, the rest of the 53 seats went to four opposition parties, who consented to form the Alliance for European Integration that put the Communist party into opposition, the party which was in power since 2001.⁷ After this, in 2010, they restored the original Moldovan Declaration of Independence, which was initially approved on 27 August 1991 but burned during the civil unrest. By 2010 it became clear for anybody, but mainly the Russian administration that those demonstrations which are mediated by social media are capable to transform the political landscape of a country.

2. ADAPTING THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT TO THE NEW SITUATION

Already in 1981, Clifford Geertz started to use the phrase “theater state” because he thought that this kind of state focuses simply on the result of representation rather than on economic growth or the improvement of human wellbeing.⁸ Russia's recent warfare strategy is as much about information then the military potential. The social media sites support the Russian attempts because they have resources to create or restore the potentials of weak political actors. While it has already been proven by numerous studies, that social media platforms can significantly affect the emergence and process of upheavals,⁹ it is often neglected that traditional media still play a key role by legitimating the processes. This

6 JACOBS, F. Transnistrian Time-Slip.

7 SCHWIRTZ, M. A Polarized Moldova Votes, Mindful of West and Russia.

8 GEERTZ, CLIFFORD. Negara: The Theater State in 19th Century Bali. DUNN AND BOBICK used the phrase on Russia, see DUNN, ELIZABETH CULLEN & BOBICK, MICHAEL. The empire strikes back, s. 406.

9 ALSAYYAD, N. – GUVENC, M. Virtual Uprisings, s. 2018-2019.

legitimation is necessary for pushing masses of individuals to take further steps and activate the network of politically weak actors. This is the effect of the complex interrelationship between traditional media (radio, television, newspapers, etc.) and social media in which they mutually strengthen each other.

The traditional Russian media was completely controlled by the state under the Soviet-era, however, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of the local media has been privatized. Therefore, the primary aim of the new administration was to bring state control back. Consequently, the method of the administration moved away from direct influence such as bullying of reporters to a policy of reorganization of media assets.¹⁰ One example of this reorganization method was the 1993-established NTV television station, which grew a significant channel of opposition in the post-Soviet era and therefore became a stick in the administration's eye. Mostly because their programs on the channel explained alternative political viewpoints, even, openly disapproving with President Putin's political acts. However, less than a decade, the station had lost its opponent political edge when he state-owned Gazprom Media seized the NTV. In the end of 2011, when the demonstrations which summoned into questioning the reelection of Putin, the channel's political about-turn became obvious. The NTV proceeded to strengthen the status of the government not only by broadcasting documentaries but by describing the demonstrators as being funded by the USA.

During the Moldovan parliamentary election protest it became obvious that by using social media the participants were performing in ways that Russia was not able to control. It was clear, even though Russia's attempts to master the Internet include a mixture of technological and non-technological approaches started already in the 1990s. In this year, the security agencies started to use tools called SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities) in order to gather, examine and save all data that is sent or received on Russian networks, including e-mails, other messages and browser history. Network providers are expected to connect the SORM, and although a court order is needed to gather data, providers cannot view the content of the command or know what is being collected. The Internet is also controlled by non-technological policies such as governmental influence used on organizations such as paid bloggers, trolls that post content and opinions favorable to the administration; and over a legal framework that extends surveillance at times of political

¹⁰LIPMAN, M. Russia's nongovernmental media under assault, s. 179–190.

upheaval.¹¹ However, after the millennium, demonstrators started to use the social media that Russia seemingly cannot control.

Even though a new media channel popped up with the advent of social media, the traditional media channels are still relevant by creating reports that suit the expectations of consumer, namely the state. Through in- or outstate conflicts, these traditional media channels have the power of unifying the groups within communities or nations and keep alive this connection. With the advent of social media, the online conversation has become an important place for the circulation of certain messages, utilizing usual residents into propaganda machines capable of spreading disinformation. According to Etling, during the Ukrainian conflict, the lack of trust is widespread and occasionally were manipulated by the authorities¹² Therefore, in the light of the Moldavian events, it is possible to treat the Ukrainian conflict as a significant turnabout in how the Internet is applied during demonstrations. The point is that the governments have understood how to handle social networks to their advantage, consolidating it into their disinformation armory.

In 2013 the British The Guardian published that there is a fake news distribution office outside of St. Petersburg, from where up to ten thousands comments per day were published.¹³ In the same year, journalists from the Russian newspapers, Moi Raion and Novaya Gazeta infiltrated as job seekers in the fake news distribution office outside of St. Petersburg, Olgino. They discovered that in the office, hundreds of paid bloggers worked daily under fake names, seemingly without an employment contract. From their reports a more extensive audience got an insight into a troll's daily work routine, he explained what kinds of comments they made and where they had to publish them. This interview became one of the earliest stories showing first-hand testimony on organized trolling in Russia or other Russian-speaking countries. In January 2015, the AIN Ukrainian website published an interview with a man who has worked for the company of the most prominent oligarch in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, the existence of Russian paid pro-government individuals is officially denied.

The aim of the so-called “Russian Troll Army” was to inject Kremlin policy-supporting content to the social networks sites manually. Their duty was to criticize the

11 SOLDATOV, A. & BOROGAN, I. The Red Web: The Struggle between Russia's Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries.

12 ETLING, B, FARIS, R., PALFREY J., ET AL. Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization.

13 GREGORY, P. R. Putin's new weapon in the Ukraine propaganda war: internet trolls.

14 VORONA, TIMUR. Kak rabotayut internet trolli I kak ix raspoznat: intervyyu s byvshim axmetovskim botom.

opponents through social media, and the comment sections of both the local and the global media. The main battlefield were the Ukrainian events. According to the New York Times, the workers of the fake news distribution office were inspired to write comments that discredited Petro Poroshenko and to emphasize the crimes of the Ukrainian military.¹⁵ Moreover, they should write nothing good about the Ukrainian administration and nothing wrong about the Donetsk People's Republic or the Luhansk People's Republic.¹⁶ Therefore the Russian media control before the Ukrainian conflict spread to the Internet, which was already regarded as crucial as the television, radio and print media, and which had emerged onto an important scene, particularly after the uprising of Moldova in 2009.

3. DISTRIBUTING FAKE NEWS

The use of bots is under-researched compared to the research on paid trolls. During several day-long tumults, it is challenging to isolate reality from fiction, and it is almost impossible to discover who is behind a disinformation operation. Recent interviews and secondary data imply the next types of bots. The most important are the amplifier and impact bots that are used to like and to share certain content or create a mass following for specific pages or persons or to establish a more significant presence in the online sphere. The use of amplifier bots for content advertising goals builds a misleading narrative for the users, who will only see a specific story from a particular angle. Generally, bots are easily identifiable because they are using repetitive phrases and contents. Various software packages, like the NodeXL open-source network analysis package does not just gather information about the network, but pulls the publicly-available metadata, therefore, it gives information about each account and its owner's behavior.¹⁷ Applying automatic language classification to a protest-related dataset on Twitter, we are able to examine how the Russian representation during the different stages of the Euromaidan evolved. The Twitter API automatically detects different languages, determining the language of a particular message. As criteria for data collection, I used similar to other studies the expression "Евромайдан" in the body of each message.¹⁸ Based on this criterion, during this investigation, the dataset contained thousands of messages

¹⁵ CHEN, ADRIAN. The agency.

¹⁶ WALKER, S. Salutin' Putin: inside a Russian troll house.

¹⁷ ZHDANOVA, M. & ORLOVA, D. Computational Propaganda in Ukraine: Caught Between External Threats and Internal Challenges. Working Paper No. 2017.9.

¹⁸ For further language analysis see POELL, T. & DARMONI, K. Twitter as a multilingual space: The articulation of the Tunisian revolution through #sidibouzid, s. 14–34; LYEBYEDYEV, Y. & MAKHORTYKH, M. #Euromaidan: Quantitative Analysis of Multilingual Framing 2013–2014 Ukrainian Protests on Twitter, s. 276–280.

between January and March 2014, which were sorted into chronological subsets according to the main events.

Until 19th January, the tweets in Russian language frequently carried pejorative judgments of the demonstrations. Already at the beginning of the protest movement, some of these tweets associated the demonstrators with fascists. However, after the above mentioned date, that marked the Hrushevskogo Street disturbances, when the number of tweets increased significantly. During this time the subjects focused on the brutality of the Ukrainian special police forces, while other messages similar to the earliest stage, included negative appraisals of the demonstrations, inviting to strike the pro-Euromaidan supporters. This high activity still predominated the Twitter stream until February 2, because a mass protest was held in Moscow to support the Euromaidan. Another trending content was the tragic death of an Armenian-Ukrainian Euromaidan activist, Serhiy Nigoyan, who was fatally shot during the Hrushevskogo disturbances, where he was acting as security guard. A low activity characterized the following period from 5 February, where the main topic was the confrontation between demonstrators and police forces, however, the most tweets still concentrated on the fight in Kyiv.

The activity rose again from mid-February on, which can be associated with the disruption of the struggle. More precisely the start of collisions between police and demonstrators in Kyiv on February 18, which left several people injured or dead. The Russian Twitter messages dominated the days between 2-14 March, mainly because the users withdrew their focus from mainland Ukraine to Crimea. The general theme was the judgment of Russia's intervention in Crimea, but various criticisms contrasted this viewpoint by indicating the alleged intimidations to the local Russian population. Many users wrote about the Crimean crisis, which they considered as a straight outcome of Euromaidan, indicating the turmoil in Ukraine. Another frequent subject was that remained a possible Ukrainian threat against the peninsula. The Russian messages were limitedly affected by the pro-Maidan campaign and proposed several different coverages of the demonstrations, which covered both pro and anti-Maidan views, also covering both the deaths and matters about the adverse outcomes of excluding Yanukovych from the power.

The disinformation strategies relied on either reused photographs or made-up materials and eyewitnesses as well. According to the Ukrainian site Stopfake.org, appropriate sources helped to make up the content for disinformation. There are many examples of situations when somebody tries to legitimize disinformation through the application of videos or photos

obtained from other news content. One of these examples was a Syrian war victim's photo from 2013, which was used a year later to serve as a proof that Ukrainian soldiers had injured young person in Slowjansk. A bit later, the same photo about the boy became a wounded boy from Donetsk.¹⁹ In May, a photo started to spread on Twitter, depicting a sad girl who was sitting next to her allegedly murdered mother. However, as the Stopfake claimed, the photo did not come from Donbass as the Tweets claimed but from a movie, called *The Brest Fortress*, which was a Russian and Belarusian coproduction of 2010.²⁰ Also in May, several mostly pro-Russian demonstrators died in a fire at the Trade Unions House in Odessa. On Facebook, Dr. Igor Rozovski published that Ukrainian nationalists did not let him to treat the wounded Russians. This post was shared more than two thousand times, however, Rozovski's profile picture arrived from a dentist's profile from Russia, and his alleged account was opened right before the story was published.²¹

Another example would be Boris Nemtsov, who was one of the most important critics of Vladimir Putin until his death on 27 February 2015. Nemtsov was assassinated next to his Ukrainian partner Anna Duritskaya, on a bridge near the Kremlin in Moscow. A journalist, Alec Luhn observed that a few hours after the assassination a group of Twitter accounts were already attempting to sway the same narrative: "Ukrainians killed him..." The complete list of accounts tweeting that exact phrase revealed an extended community of Twitter users and their network, including around 2900 accounts. The NodeXL open-source network analysis software package does not only gather information about the network, but extracts the publicly-available metadata as well, therefore, it gives information about each account and its owner's behavior. The analyzed network showed that the 87% of profiles had no time zone information and 92% had no Twitter favorites. In comparison a randomized sample of Twitter users has only 15% of the accounts without favorites and around 51% of the users without time zone.²²

Unquestionably, the Internet has the possibility to build a space for separatism in Russia. However, the revival of the separatist to the reality that the social media can be used by both sides, not just the side one likes, was abrupt. As social media became more successful, a new kind of disinformation campaign began that effortlessly transferred from the

19STOPFAKE. Fake photos appeared on the Internet, of children who were supposedly killed in Eastern Ukraine.

20STOPFAKE. Snapshot of movie *The Brest Fortress* is being presented as a photo of Donbass.

21STOPFAKE. Fake: nationalists prevented paramedic from saving a wounded.

22ALEXANDER, L. Social network analysis reveals full scale of Kremlin's Twitter bot campaign. *Global Voices*.

old to the new media, and that is often linking to each other. For example, on July 2014, Channel One broadcasted a story highlighting a woman probably from Slavyansk who criticized the crucifixion of a 3-year-old boy. Ukrainian soldiers, she declared, had killed him in order to intimidate the residents of the city. No investigation verified the report, and the story was circulating. What was remarkable, that the report was originally posted on Facebook by pro-Kremlin ideologue Alexander Dugin,²³ and Channel One chose it and created its shocking news a few days later. This demonstrates how traditional media can publish incorrect information observed on social media, presenting fake news with an aura of legitimization.

CONCLUSION

In Ukraine, the Russian administration performed a more advanced, but similar tactic than earlier in Transnistria. Under the appearance of preserving the peace or guarding the rights of Russian-language speakers, the Russian administration has sponsored separatism both politically and through material aid. In 2009, the Russian attempts collided with serious resistance, when the Moldovan students with the assistance of the social network sites started to organize themselves and announced protests against the Communists. However, five years later in Ukraine, the sequence of the Russian strategy has changed. First, with the assistance of the social media they thoughtfully modified the political scene by weakening that side which was least ready to confront a new class of war. Inflaming the debate about the question of ethnic diversity, not just the Web2 society, but a well-organized bot operation also constructed the image of Euromaidan that we perceive these days.

This strategy was capable to create a basis for the follow-up events, after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that ousted the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian separatists and Russian Armed Forces took over Crimea. A controversial Crimea-wide referendum, unconstitutional under the Ukrainian and Crimean constitutions, was held on the issue of reunification with Russia. However, Russia formally annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014, incorporating the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the idea of building a purely Russian internet system to counter with the Western dominance in the cyber world. It seems that the Russian administration was capable of using the cyber sphere for their own sake effectively already in 2014.

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THE MILITARY ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY

Csaba VIDA

ABSTRACT

Nowadays, security has become more and more complex, so in order to understand security processes, it is necessary to systematize security. Therefore, the author of the study wants to present the results of one of his researches on the field of security studies. These results show, where the military elements of security are located. Based on complex interpretation of security can be distinguished the different dimensions of the security. In spite of the overlap dimensions and close connection between dimensions, it is possible to define the security elements belonging to that dimension. The military dimension of security is very complex and it is therefore necessary to define the military elements of the security. The author outlines two theories for this. It also raises the scientifically question that military science basically deals with military elements of security.

Keywords: security, military, security studies, military science, dimension of security

INTRODUCTION

The changes in the security environment have become faster and unpredictable in the 21th centuries. Thus, the speed identification of the security events and processes are increasingly important. In parallel the security and the security environment have become more and more complex, so it is necessary to systematize security. It gives us help, that the security studies are rapidly and spectacularly developed after the Cold War, mainly from 2001.¹ It is related to the emergence of asymmetric and transnational challenges.² Development of the security studies is well illustrated, that the representatives of the security theories update and revise their works yearly or every two-three years.³ It can be stated that many books have been published in the field of security studies, but very few works deal with

¹ The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States caused a paradigm change in the world security systems, including the security theory.

² These include terrorism, illegal migration, cyber threats, international organized crime, etc.

³ Among others: Donald M. Snow or Barry Buzan

the systematizing of security. In my opinion, that a better understanding of the security processes and events requires detailed analysis of security element, especially in the military field. Overview of the international literature has supported my conclusion, because only few books include the sectors of the security. For example Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde gave us kind of a good answer for the determination of the security sectors in them books, which title of “Security: the new framework of analysis”.⁴

The precise definition or determination of the military element of security is essential to continuous update the strategic security documents of the country, to develop plans for use of the armed forces, to determine the role of armed forces, mainly in the framework state defence. For example, precise knowledge of the military elements of security is essential to determine and update the direction of the development of the armed forces. The finding of the military element has become much more important due to the appearance and spread of asymmetric and transnational challenges, and in the period of hybrid and cyber warfare.

Based on my research in the field of the security studies, I developed two models for defining military element of security. I believe that by using these models, it is possible to determine more precisely whether one of the facts affecting security belongs to the military elements or the other elements of security, for example economic, political, environmental or social elements.

During my research, I came to the conclusion, that the military science is essentially concerned with the military elements of security. It also underlines the close relationship between security studies and military science. This confirm the crucial role the military science in the system of guaranteeing security in the country.

1. CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM OF SECURITY (DIMENSION, LEVELS)

The security has no unified conceptual system, among others in Hungary. This is one of fundamental debates between realist and idealist approach in the theory of the international relations and security studies, because it is the differing views on the concept of the security. The representatives of theories call to debate of the broader and narrower interpretation of the security. The broader and narrower concept of security differs in the interpretation of security. The narrower only examines two subsystem of the society: the political and the military, whereas the broader interpretation examines many subsystems of the society, in addition to

⁴ BUZAN, Barry – WEAVER, Ole – DE WILDE, Jaap: Security – A new framework for analysis

the political and military dimension, society, economy, social, environment, cultural and ecological etc.. In the international relations, Barry Buzan⁵, representative of the English school, developed his theory on the five dimension (sector) of the security. At the beginning of the 21th century it provides perhaps one of most accurate answers in defining the conceptual framework of the security in the security studies.

According to the conceptual system, security usually means the lack of a threat. The person can be felt himself/herself who is free of the threat, what can be coming from various hazards. Therefore, security is that condition, in which the subject of security is able to respond appropriately to a threat to him or her. There may be that condition in which the threat ceases to exist, but it is an ideal, rather utopian status. Security is real when the threat is equal to or less than the defence capability. However, if the defence capability is too high, it can generate new threats. This is the basic theses of the security dilemma. So it can be stated that the security issue is based on two important elements - threat and defence capability.

In security studies theory, we distinguish four levels of security: the individual, the national, the international (regional), and the global. These are also considered as levels of analysis in international relations theory. At the individual level, we examine the security situation of members (individuals) of society. The safety of individuals also has a significant impact on other levels of security because the individual's sense of security also determines the security of the community of which he or she is a member, but the individual's security is affected by different effects (threats) than other levels of security. The security of an individual is primarily affected by factors related to person livelihood (financial existence), including financial, economic and social and social elements. At the national level, we analyse the security situation of a given state (country), which is much more complex than the individual level, because here there is not only one subject of security, but a large community, where they appear conflict interests within the community in the field of security. The state or country is one of the main objects of international relations, it plays a decisive role in the international and global level of security. There is only a difference between the global and international (regional) level in terms of number of players and complexity. At the end of the 20th century, international and global associations, organizations and multinational non-governmental organizations play an increasingly important role in international and global security. The emergence of new elements is primarily supported by the neoliberal school

⁵ Barry Buzan is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University.

because, in their opinion, many organizations, institutions, companies and foundations have a significant impact on security as a result of globalization. This is the view taken by Pevehouse and Goldstein in writing about the increasing influence of multinationals, non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations.⁶ In this context, in the 21st century, military power, as one of the decisive elements in guaranteeing security, was partly removed from the state monopoly because of the emergence of legal private companies, which perform mostly guarding (military) tasks on the basis of government decisions. The international and global level of security remains dominated by anarchy. At these levels, however the emergence of globalization is increasingly evident, leading; on the one hand to greater integration and on the other to increased divisions (between poor and rich communities).

Security can be examined not only at security levels, but also within the subsystems of society in which the security factor plays a role. These subsystems are called security dimensions or sectors. There is no consensus among researchers on the use of dimension and sector definition, among others as use Buzan and Weaver in their works.⁷ While Al-Rodhan interpret dimensions to areas of security in his analysis of global security.⁸ At the same time, Heiner Hanggi divides security into different areas, distinguishing between two large groups, military and non-military.⁹ The non-military area divides security into political, economic, societal (social) and environmental sectors. The sector, in my opinion, has rather two-dimensional geographic meaning, while the dimension may have a three-dimensional dimension, which may better represent some areas of security. There are significant differences in the number and definition of dimensions (sectors) in international specialist literature. Researchers of RAND Corporation (Bearne, Olikar, O'Brien and Rathmell) distinguish between the political, military, economic, public security, legal, communications, financial, diplomatic and intelligence aspects of UK security sector reform. In defining the number of dimensions, – if taken in its entirety – there are many dimensions of security, including military, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, industrial, commercial, human, social, the environmental, health (epidemiological), legal, public security, national security (intelligence services) and demographic dimensions, so all subsystems of society are elements of security. However, the myriad dimension renders security testing unmanageable, and

⁶ PEVEHOUSE, John C. – GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.: International Relations

⁷ BUZAN, Barry – WEAVER, Ole – DE WILDE, Jaap: Security – A new framework for analysis

⁸ AL-RODHAN, Nayef: The five dimension of global security

⁹ HANGGI, Heiner: Making sense of Security Sector Governance

dimensions that cover almost every segment of security analysis need to be defined. The sectors identified by Buzan-Weaver are the best answer, distinguishing the military, political, economic, social and environmental sectors (dimensions).

2. MILITARY DIMENSION OF SECURITY

According to the theory of security studies, one of the dimensions of security is military, in which action against security threats usually requires military potential, and most of the threats are of a military nature. Security cannot be understood without the military dimension because military threats threaten the direct existence of security objects. The role (position) of the military dimension has changed significantly over the past one and a half decades, as it has played a major role in the Cold War because of global opposition. Following the end of military confrontation, the role of the military dimension has significantly diminished, as other dimensions, particularly economic and environmental ones, have come to the forefront. But, after 2014, the military dimension of security again took on a greater role. The military dimension is emphasized on two levels of security, national and international.

There are significant overlaps between the military dimension and other security dimensions. The size of the common subsets also illustrates the closeness between the dimensions. The closest relationship to politics is because they use each other's assets, but they are heavily dependent on the economic dimension, which ensures that the military dimension is maintained. The social dimension is also the main element of the military dimension, the number of the population determines the military force. It may have the least relationship with the environmental dimension, but in the 21st century, the military dimension is increasingly influenced by climate change and the nature of nature.

The military dimension is the most institutionalized of the subsystems of society, which is well illustrated by the facts, because there are significant overlaps between the dimensions of security and the subsystems of society. According to the classical interpretation, the state (country) is the main player in the military dimension according to the theory of international relations, because the central government of the state is the main actor of guaranteeing security. If the central government is unable to ensure state security, then some segments or sections of society will be forced to take over the system of tasks of ensuring security. This is typically the case in fragile countries hit by crises (in the failed states). There are many African and Asian countries where tribes and warlords guarantee the security of parts of the country. However, besides the state, new players have emerged as

a result of globalization, which can also be considered as the object of the military dimension. These include international organizations and institutions, some multinational companies (e.g. private security companies), and organized crime groups, as these objects also affect security in the military dimension. However, only the state has the capacity to ensure its own security. This traditional interpretation was based on the Westphalian system.¹⁰ In practice – highlights in the 20th century – other objects of the military dimension appeared, contributing to the creation and maintenance of security. Non-state objects affect not only internal but also external security. These objects include, at national level, mostly armed groups involved in security formation due to the weakness of central government, and international organizations, alliances and multinational companies at international level. Organizations and alliances and agreements and treaties that have an impact on security generally have very little own military potential, but they use rather mediation, based on the common security interests of the participating states (countries). The states have military potential in these cases, so they only offer the military potential for the organization and for the sake of a treaty. These objects can have both positive and negative effects on security. Non-state actors are involved in parallel the state, as a complement or adversary, in shaping military security.

According to the newest research results, in the military dimension, the state is still a major player in security with the appropriate military potential (military strength). The state is able to direct and control the situation of security. The state has a clear and clean role in the military dimension because guaranteeing security by military means. Any state that is not able to perform its function properly will face security problems. Not only state but other non-state factors can play a role in guaranteeing security, but the sole control of military control is the state, that is, the central government. At the international level, in addition to the state, military organizations, alliances, and coalitions, but internationally accepted principles, treaties, and theories that affect military security appear as actors impact to the military dimension. There can be reference to armaments reduction agreements, but also to the theory of military balance of power.

At the national level the state is not always the only actor in the military dimension, even in democracies, because decisions of the central government on the use of military force can be influenced by many factors. In the United States, social action against the Vietnam War has influenced the military decision making process. When the state loses control of the

¹⁰ Westphalian system is based on the sovereignty of state, is the principle in international law that each state has exclusive sovereignty over its territory.

military, then the military alone acts to guarantee security. In the military dimension, intelligence services also play a decisive role in shaping security, as they have a significant influence on the state's decision-making process and on the application of military force, thus acting as military security actors.

In the military dimension, the all actors are always organized and hierarchical actors who fully implement the instructions of the central government. In the non-state actors (such as tribes, resistance groups, clans, mafia, criminal groups) can by also find this hierarchical system. The military dimension can not only have military actors (military potentials) but also actors from other (economic, political) dimensions original actors. Based on the above, several actors can be distinguished in the military dimension that are functionally involved in guaranteeing military security. These functional actors have the military potential to make a real impact on security. These are range from military leadership, through teams, to military-industrial complexes, but can include all factors involved in maintaining and supporting military capabilities. Subsystems of society are also interested in maintaining the military potential at a sufficient level so that the society (state) is able to carry out independent activities in international relations. In the state, the central coordinator of security is central government, which is also a functional player in the dimension. In non-democratic countries, the military dimension is not always controlled by the government.

The state, on the basis of the idea of sovereignty, can use military force to its protect as part of its response to threats. Based on this, the state has the right to develop military capabilities that can be used as a tool in the military dimension of security. The state can use military force against both internal and external threats. The military forces also provides the state with capabilities. The military forces does not always serve to enhance the security of the country. In some cases, the use of military force in fulfilling international obligations may be aimed at performing tasks that have no or only a minor, sometimes more negative, impact on national security. The most serious threat with the military forces is when it is not use in the best interests of the country and the central government is not able to control and check it. In these cases the security of the country is seriously damaged. A further negative aspect of military strength may be the over-enhancement of security, which is considered a security dilemma in security studies. The central question of the dilemma: how long can security be enhanced? Historical experience has shown that measures to enhance security, including the enhancement of military capabilities, cannot increase the security of the country boundlessly, as these measures pose a threat to other countries, which are forced to take additional security measures, which creates another threat. This is one of the definitions of the armaments race,

because it has a spiral impact. During the Cold War, the two superpowers reach to Mutually Assured Destruction¹¹ as a result of the security dilemma.

The threats in the military dimension of security are not always of military origin, but it is in any case necessary to take military action or to threat of military force required, that counter them. Such threats include mass illegal migration, the emergence of extremist ideologies and terrorism. In this dimension we can distinguish between external and internal threats. Internal threats include, – between others –, separatists, revolutionaries, terrorists, organized crime and other movements that oppose the country's constitutional order, peace and public order. External threats include military threats to the country's independence and territorial integrity. If the level of military threat from beyond the country's borders is extremely high, counteracting the military threat is central to the activities of society as a whole. The best example of this is the case of Israel, where the whole of society is preparing to counter an attack by Arabic countries.

3. UTILIZATION OF MILITARY ELEMENTS

To determine the military elements of security, two different models can be established based on the latest result of the research of the security studies and theory of the international relations. Representatives of the security studies are attempting to identify the military elements, but not in all spectrum the security, but only in its certain segments.

The first model basically examines military elements separately in the different dimensions of the security, considering as well common subsets of the dimensions. The model groups the military elements of security according to the five dimensions (military, political, economic, social and environmental).

The second model regardless of security dimensions, examines the nature of the military elements, from which it can be concluded that the elements from three distinct group (units). The groups are distinguished by their nature and the direction in which they affect the security.

In addition to the two models, there may, of course, be other methods and models by which military elements can be identified, but so far no such research has been done in the field of security studies.

¹¹ During the mutually guaranteed destruction, the opposing parties accumulated so many nuclear weapons that they were capable of destroying the Earth multiple times.

3.1. MODEL – BASED ON SECURITY ELEMENTS

In this model, the finding of the military elements of the security is not according to the nature of the elements and their impact on security, but about the elements are present in which dimension. Most military elements are, of course, in the military dimension, but military elements as well appear in the other dimension of the security. These elements are not always of military origin, nevertheless they must nevertheless be classified as military because they induce military related effects. These include, but are non-military threats in various dimensions of security which require military reactions or the prospect of military force being forced. Among the military elements as well include such activities that do not result from the classical use of military force but from the use of special capabilities of the military organization (transportation, engineer capabilities, CBRN, search-rescue, telecommunication and law enforcement).

The next part of study, I examine the military elements of security in the five dimension of security:

Military dimension

In the military dimension of the security all elements are military. Central element is the armed forces, and its equipment, military threats, and various military activities/operations. Military forces include not only the state's armed forces, but also all forces that have military capability and impact on security, including paramilitary organizations, terrorist groups, organized crime groups, law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, private security firms, and military contingent of international organizations. Military elements can also be considered international military organizations with military capabilities, as well as, equipment of military forces, as weapons, weapons systems and military technical devices, equipment, military used civilian equipment. The weapons of mass destruction and their delivery equipment can be grouped separately. Furthermore, elements include military infrastructure such as military objects and defence systems. Military threats are those threats, potential threats, risks and challenges, that result from hostile or non-allied military potential. The next group of military elements in this dimension are military or military type actions and activities, usually performed by military forces.

Political dimension

Military elements appearing in the political dimension are basically divided into two parts. One is the political decision-making, legislative and governing organizations (boards) and individuals (leaders) that determine the military potential of a state.¹² The other is political threats, which can not only direct but also indirect. The first category includes political such decision-making forum and organizations that have an impact on the development, maintenance and using of a state's military capabilities. This include legislative bodies, state leaders or legislation that influence the application, development and maintenance of the states military potential. Those leaders have control over military potential, and use it for political (foreign policy) and support of state's interest (including deterrence). International organizations, alliances and treaties are military elements that affect the military potential of the members' states. The second group means political threats, which includes the unstable and failed states, non-allied states and its hostile foreign policy, and any political threat that threatens the state's existence or security and requires military actions and political sanctions. These include – among others – political sanctions, political influence, hostile alliances.

Economic dimension

In the economic dimension can also identifies military elements that have an impact on maintaining military strength (potential) and identifies economic threats that require military potential to address them. Elements that influence military strength (power) include economic capability of the state, which enables the development and maintenance of military capabilities, and military complexes, the development and produce of weapon of mass destruction, and legal arms trade. In contrast, military elements that negatively impact security in the economic dimension include illegal arms trade and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, that require special military capabilities or response capabilities. The economic crisis has serious impact for the military capabilities, because its do not allow the proper use of military force.

In addition, negative military elements include industrial catastrophes, which require special capabilities of the armed forces to deal with their consequences, and threats of an economic nature that require military capabilities (eg. economic sanctions, deliberate economic damage).

¹² E.g. parliament, government, national level committees, security council, etc.

Social dimension

In the social dimension the military element is the demographic situation of the country, which determines the number of troops of military, can be considered as a factor influencing military power. Another factor is the social support of the state's military forces, of the military aspirations and of the military interests. Factors negatively affecting security in the social dimension that make the use or involvement of military force inevitable, like a humanitarian disasters, which result migration wave also necessitates the use of military force. Furthermore, illegal migration and serious violations of public and constitutional order, which the law enforcement forces of the country are unable to prevent, require the involvement of the military.

Environmental dimension

In the environmental dimension, factors influencing military power also appear, such as military geographic elements that influence military activity. There are negative factors, such as environmental and natural disasters, which require the using of special capabilities of the military force to deal with the consequences. This includes intentional environmental damage that requires military force to prevent, and adverse environmental changes that affect a state's military capabilities.

In the case of the security dimensions, I assigned the given military element to those dimensions from which it has an impact on security. Of course, the list may not be exhaustive, as there may still be elements that are military elements, but not listed above. With the above list I have tried to present the models.

3.2. MODEL – BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE ELEMENTS

Another model for defining military elements of security examines the nature of military elements and their effects on security. Based on this, military elements basically form three groups (units). The effect-based unit of elements is military threats, potential threats, risk factors and challenges, which generally have a negative and one-way effect on security. The process-based unit of elements is military conflicts, operations and actions, which are mostly negative but sometimes positive and have a bilateral effect on security. The central functional player of the elements is the military force, which induces a bilateral and two-way effect on security. Not only military units belonging to the state monopoly are included in the military force, but also all armed organizations with classical military capabilities. Based on this, we can divide the various military forces into two, one is a military power linked to state

power, including armed forces, intelligence services and law enforcement forces and military troops delegated by states of international organizations. Non-state military forces include terrorist groups, rebel groups fighting against state power, and some organized crime groups.

Based on previous, it can be concluded that military elements form create a complex system on one side threats, risks and challenges of different levels, on the other side defence capabilities (military forces), the link between the two is a system of military activity. When examining the impact on security, threats, risk factors and challenges have a negative impact, while defence capabilities have a mostly positive effect, but sometimes a negative effect. Military activity system can be positive or negative effect, depending on its nature.

Military elements of threats and security problems

Military hazards (threats) and security problems are not always determined objectively, because the sense of danger for society is subjective. The steps taken to maintain safety are much simpler when the hazards are known and clean. When it is not possible to identify specific hazards, it is also much more difficult to increase security. (e.g. in the case of hybrid threats) Based on this, it is much easier to identify a military threat than it is for other threats. When analysing state security, military threats are a priority because they endanger the very existence of the state. In the case of the state, the response to military threats has usually always social unity. Threats have a much greater efficiency in up close than remotely, but as distance increases, the level of threat decreases non-linearly. Nature of military threats are distance, historical tradition, experience, publicity or concealment of the threat. Classical military threats include threats, risks, and challenges that result from hostile or non-allied military potentials and their equipment. In this case, military capabilities mean not only conventional armed forces, but any organization that has military capabilities. Other types of military threats include all those that, among other things, come from asymmetric challenges, because military threats may not always be triggered by hostile or non-federal military potential, but arrive from different subsystems of society. In these cases, either the use of military force or the threat of military force is required to counter the threat. However, in these cases is not usually the classic use of military force is required, but the special capabilities of military force. (e.g. among others transportation, engineer, CBRN, search-rescue, telecommunication and SOF capabilities)

Military elements of defence capabilities

The centre of defence capabilities is military power, which not only represents the country's armed forces, but also many other actors with military characteristics. According to the classic interpretation, military force is the armed forces of the state, which includes besides the armed forces, state armed organizations such as the National Guard, Border Guard, Presidential Guards, Intelligence Services, etc.. In addition to the armed forces associated with the state, appeared organizations, institutions, companies and groups with military capabilities.

According to the classical concept, military power is related to the hard component of state power, which is capable of applying violence (force) against another side (state, group of states) and has various capabilities of destruction. So military power is a kind of state power that has to fulfil many tasks.

Tasks include:¹³

- protecting the territory of the country against other countries;
- the fight against terrorist organizations;
- enforcement compromises in non-military conflicts;
- action against armed rebel groups;
- implementation of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
- the enforcement of economic sanctions;
- representation of the country;
- maintaining public order.

Defence capabilities are greatly determined by creation condition of military force. Brooks and Stanley explain in their study¹⁴, that the main sources of military power remain the material and human (demographic) capabilities of the state, but other factors such as the global environment, political culture, system of society, political and social institutions also influence the creation of military power. According to Brooks and Stanley, the latter more influences to which the state uses its resources. Other analysts say the main sources of military power are the economy, technology and human capital, but they also say that the effectiveness of the use of resources determines the capabilities of military forces. All in all, military power is determined by the strength and ability of the state. Military power, in

¹³ Stephen D. Biddle: Military power – Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

¹⁴ Risa Brooks – Elizabeth A. Stanley: Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness

addition to basic resources, is determined by its effectiveness, which can be deduced from the extent to which the resources are used. Effectiveness is influenced by a number of factors including the quality of command and control, the level of training, staff morale, application principles (doctrines), the quality of the armaments and equipment, and the technological knowledge that necessary for the application. However, there are several debates on the effectiveness of different part of science. Sociological point of view (Edvard Shils and Morris Janowitz), efficiency is seen in the motivation of the population, in the organizational unity (cohesion) of the given population. Other sociologists, not at the organizational level, but at the individual level found that effectiveness is influenced by individual initiative, discipline, courage, and nationalism, but also by the ability of society to integrate. According to political scientists - Stephen Rose, Dar Reitner, Allan Stam and Robert Zirkle - efficiency is playing an increasingly important role in the military, confirm by the military conflicts of the last decades. In their view, efficiency is determined by the economic, social and political systems. Among them, control over the resources and the preparedness of the staff also played an important role. In contrast, military historians, based on the experience of past wars, efficiency back to the virtues of the leader.¹⁵

In addition to independent factors and efficiency, the potential of military force is influenced by the characteristics of its activities. These include strategies, doctrines, operational-combat plans and procedures. The modes of action ensure that the military force implements its tasks. It also includes elements of the military force's organizational activities, such as command and control, organizational system (structure), system of training and education, the system of personnel and financial resources and intelligence capabilities. These operational characteristics provide the actions, operations, and wars carried out by the military forces, which are process-based factors in the military dimension of security. According to some military analysts, the nature of the military force's activities have two ways of distinguishing between defence and offensive activity. It is not always possible to distinguish between defence and offensive character in a given activity.

By examining the military elements of defence capabilities, in addition to the classic interpretation of military power, it must analyse the armed forces of the states, organizations, corporations, and groups (hereafter organizations) with military potential. We can further group the military forces into legal and illegal organizations, which their relationship with the state power defines position of these organizations. The organizations that cooperate with and

¹⁵ Risa Brooks – Elizabeth A. Stanley: Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness

support the state authority are legal, as private security firms that carry out government orders. Other legal bodies are international organizations and federations that respect international law and international norms. Illegal organizations are revolutionary, guerrilla and terrorist organizations against the country's constitutional order.

Military elements of the military activity system

The link between defence capabilities and military threats is the military action system, which aims to response threats, risks and challenges with military force.

CONCLUSION

In my opinion, these two security policy models make it relatively easy to determine what the military elements of security are. Identification of military elements is basically necessary to define the framework of military science. But, more importantly, in today's complex and changing world in the field of security, the task systems and capabilities of the armed forces can be better defined. In the case of the new challenges, such as hybrid warfare or cyberattacks, it is very difficult to separate civilian (law enforcement) and military tasks. Similar issues arise with regard to terrorism and illegal migration. It very important, because the military force have to prepare to these special tasks too. It can be stated that since the Cold War the role of the military force has changed significantly, and during that time new tasks have appeared in the armed forces, which previously did not was. That is why it is important to identify the military elements of security precisely, because it can be stated that these new tasks are also military tasks.

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