CHALLENGES FACED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF HYBRID THREATS – SECURITY "OF A THOUSAND FACES"

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I explore the challenges facing policing in the 21st century through a multifaceted approach to security. Herein, the idea of security is seen as being filled with the evolutionary determination of humans, which is expressed in the concept of security as it applies to the individual, the need to establish an internal order of social coexistence at the level of human communities, and the relations between certain community formations, i.e. states, as well as international relations. I will show how the creation of security today is becoming an increasingly complex issue, while ancient algorithms and instincts drive the psychological mechanisms that underpin this perception. The real challenge today is how to mitigate the security deficits referred to in this study so that their impacts legitimise everyday relations and satisfy our basic evolutionary needs.

INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 2019, I was leafing through a book. A colleague of mine called it just a "blue book" in which experts, professionals and young researchers wrote about the security challenges of the 21st century (Finszter and Sabjanics, 2017). If one browses through the table of contents, they will find some 43 studies, arranged thematically in chapters, on the importance of security, the security challenges of strategic forecasts and interdisciplinary responses that embrace the topic. The volume covers – without claiming to be exhaustive – approaches to security from a military, law enforcement, economic, health care, international, national security, energy and environmental security, water security, etc. aspect.

This diversity and thematic variety reminded me of the bustling atmosphere of a whirling cavalcade at a market fair. These works are characterised by different approaches and varying degrees of focus, each of which, in its own way, provides a wealth of valuable information for those interested in the topic. This horizon is almost unfathomable. It is as if the individual pieces of a large puzzle were being outlined, some of them touching, some of them so far apart from each other that only the imagination can fill the gap that opens up. Some of its details are now fully worked out to the extremes, while other areas are just beginning to attract scientific interest. Variations on a theme, searching for possible nodes of security's rich manifestations of network-like entanglements. The complexity of the problem area requires not only effective research in the sub-areas, but also a systemic approach to them to ensure effective action to address the challenges. This is partly indicated by the editors' recommendation.

"The [...] processes of the past decades have brought to the surface threats and problems that have changed the understanding of the topic of security, differentiated needs have emerged, new areas and issues have surfaced; thus a complex, systemic overview of security challenges has become extremely timely." (Finszter and Sabjanics, 2017, p. 7)

In this dissertation, I have tried to take a multi-faceted, non-exhaustive but thought-provoking approach to security in order to draw the reader's attention also to the necessity of a systemic approach, as formulated by the editors, in addition to the timeliness thereof.

As the methodology for research of the topic an overview and critical processing of the most obvious literature sources was offered. Military, security and law enforcement science are obviously fundamental field for the investigation of the indicated issue in the title. I also considered it worthwhile to place the conceptual changes of security in a broader social science, more specifically a political and state science economics (evolutionary), psychology, cultural anthropology and history of ideas context. It not only proves its nature, but also the diversity of humanity's scientific interest in this phenomenon and the concept that seeks to capture.

1   ON THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

There is no consensus in the literature on the conceptual definition of security (Balogh, 2013), but the different approaches provide a valuable opportunity to examine the subject of research from multiple perspectives, even encyclopaedically, to display the limits of the validity of each approach (Gärtner, 2007). In addition to this diversity, the changes in the meaning of the term are not random, and sometimes their direction can be precisely defined. Today, for example, *"the classical notion of security is reactive and territorial, while the modern notion of security is of functional and preventive nature."* (Gazdag and Remek, 2018, p. 29)

The question is, of course, what is considered variable and what is invariant. My premise is that the fundamental change is not in the original content of the concept, but in the set of circumstances and acts by which security can be guaranteed. These latter circumstances are covered by the concept of protection, which can be considered as a fundamental component of security (Gazdag and Remek, 2018). Rather, I see the fact of

diversity manifested in the conceptual framework of security as a reflection of our world as an increasingly complex system. A world in which our needs remain largely unchanged, but are expressed through an increasing number of referrals, and in which creating the conditions to meet them requires ever greater effort, ever more complex organisation and ever more resources. The system for guaranteeing security has therefore become almost incomprehensibly complex. The concept, if I see it as an expression of an idea, has retained its original source and its meaning remains unchanged.

In researching this immutability, I myself first associated it with a content derivable from the etymology of the word, which denotes a state free from disturbing circumstances ("sine cura"). Furthermore, I assume that an environment protected from such conditions is in some way orderly and has value – and therefore must be protected. If I am to explore the cause of this immutability, then I should continue with the concepts of order and value, and explore the layers of their meaning. In the present case, I am content to assume the immutability of our need for a value-based order, and not to let the striking variety of forms of its historical expressions (the diversity of civilisations and cultures) deceive me and distract me from the immutability of its causes.

In my earlier study, I argued (Cieleszky, 2021) that behind the determination of systemic thinking lies an evolutionary need inspired by a priori necessity spanning across historical ages. Its manifestations are expressed in, or can be traced back to, acts of self-preservation, species-preservation and subsistence. I have summarised this idea as the idea of order, and found that its manifestations are expressed through increasingly complex social (and other) relations, in an orderly manner, representing value.

In his approach to evolutionary psychology, Tamás Bereczkei argues that the psychological mechanisms of human behaviour are universal and species-specific because of their evolutionary origins. However, it is not the manifest manifestations of behaviour (cultural variability) that are invariant, but the psychological programmes that ultimately genetically present in all human beings, and which relate in particular to interpersonal relationships (Bereczkei, 2008). However, these interpersonal relations can only be interpreted in the case of a group of a limited number of individuals (Csányi Vilmos, 2016, chap. 5.1), and given that *"our species has spent more than 99% of its evolutionary history in a hunter-gatherer mode of existence [...] and its psychological mechanisms have been selected as a result of the effects of this environment"* (Bereczkei, 2008, p. 27), there is essentially no evolutionary-level adaptive explanation for an autonomous entity interpretation of interpersonal relations in modern societies other than the aforementioned one.

So when I approach the need for security, I see it as a condition of existence that can be interpreted in the conceptual circle of the idea of order and that is supported by a legitimate value system that can be traced back to it, the framework of which is provided by the early human social formation, the group, but which today, due to our way of being, which creates increasingly complex social formations, can only be realised through increasingly complex systems. However, the fact that this is the case creates a constant need for legitimacy, given that our psychological mechanisms are not optimised for our current mode of existence. Mathematical equations write by using Equation.

2   OUR EVERYDAY SECURITY IN THE SHADOW OF GLOBALISATION

The above-mentioned cultural variability can undoubtedly be a source of invaluable experience, as the more complex the ways in which human communities have been organised into formations and the more complex the representation of reality as a consensus-based construct (Balogh, 2013) has become, the more diversified the examination of the issue of security has become. The sectoral approach to security associated with Barry Buzan and his co-authors (Buzan et al., 1997) has thus been invaluable in helping to carry out investigations that reach beyond the previous frameworks of security interpretations. One of the aims of sectoral delimitation is to make the subject of research accessible and knowable, by highlighting a part from the whole. However, the examination and exploration of the functioning of each sub-area must be carried out in a way that maintains their compatibility by the functioning of their original complex environment, i.e. our perceived reality. After all, the point is to understand the complex environmental operation that guarantees security for the reference objects in the given age and under the circumstances. Sectoral delimitation – or any delimitation – is therefore a technical act, although its concrete implementation is created precisely by the possibility of partial independence of the examined areas. Understanding how complex systems work would otherwise be beyond the reach of scientific thinking.

Taking into account practical aspects, it is also worth reflecting on the delimitation of the concept of security inherent in everyday thinking. In this sense, a distinction can be made between concepts of security applicable to international relations that are, with regard to the individual, social in nature (1), community-determined in the field of social coexistence(2), affecting relations between states(3) (Gazdag and Tálas, 2008). The latter is usually considered as part of the interdisciplinary field of security studies, which emerged after the Second World War, and is separate from international studies, while the former are the focus of interest of other disciplines (Gazdag and Remek, 2018).

The social perception of security is essentially based on the presence or absence of conditions that are relevant to the individual (health, public benefits, job and life security, etc.) and is our most direct relationship with physical reality, our physical environment and our associated needs. For a long time in the process of becoming human, the dominant force of this was the only content that could be hidden in the concept of security – a dominant force that was certainly encoded for a long time by the conservative nature of evolution (Csányi Vilmos, 2016). This is probably precisely the source of the idea we are looking for, and its determinants are being explored by human ethology, which is researching the biological basis and sources of human behaviour today, especially through the current results of the scientific approach of evolutionary psychology, which I have referred to above.

The community-determined perception already targets individuals as members of the (nowadays, state-forming) basic population that make up the community by ensuring the internal order (Gazdag and Tálas, 2008) of social coexistence. This is also the explicit field of investigation of the "young" science of law enforcement, since law enforcement in the narrow sense of the term – in the context of the modern state – is an administrative activity whose social function is to avert the dangers arising from unlawful human behaviour – in possession of the monopoly on legitimate physical violence (Finszter, 2018).

Importantly, the study of the psychological mechanisms that determine interpersonal relations is an essential element of any research that seeks to understand the functioning of the members of the basic population that make up the community and of the community itself, given the fact of evolutionary adaptation referred to in the previous chapter and their impact on the perception of security. There are convincing arguments that the sometimes dysfunctional functioning of modern societies, the identification of certain social problems as individual pathologies, are precisely the consequence of an unnatural modern social existence. In one of his lectures, Péter Popper refers to the fact that it is no wonder that people protect themselves and the people around them from the influence of social pathology by forming small communities by sticking together. It is hard not to wonder how ancient algorithms and instincts drive these psychological mechanisms, and how this affects modern man's idea of security and his needs in this regard (Popper, 2021). In this respect, therefore, if we listen to the explanation of evolutionary psychology, we must work to strengthen the elements of security that are involved in these mechanisms.

In the case of international relations between states, it is important to draw attention to some of the key changes that are contributing to the evolution of our perceptions of security in the broader sense, but also to the evolution of social and community-determined perceptions of security. The role of the reference object – the state or the nation-state – which plays a decisive role in guaranteeing security is constantly changing. With the emergence of modern states and the establishment of their relative sovereignty, the general acceptance of international law and Westphalian sovereignty, among the interpretations of sovereignty classified by Stephen D. Krasner (Varga, 2015), has created the foundation for international relations between states, undoubtedly in a system dominated by anarchy in international relations. However, what is also known as the Westphalian system – which has replaced a much more unpredictable mechanism – has been disrupted, and some speculate even broken up, by the impact of globalisation. *"Many people believe that the change in the world is driven by the struggle of civilisations. According to Ulrich Beck, this is a mistake. The reality is that the borders of nation-states are disintegrating, and the world today is characterised by a race between different cultures to gain and hold power."* (Irk, 2012, p. 25–26)

Béla Pokol argues that the *"increasing power of the global international order over individual sovereign states in many ways makes the value of sovereignty more formal in terms of the autonomy of individual states"* (Pokol, 2014, p. 1), and then argues that *"[...] the determination of sovereign states by global powers has increased enormously, and the exploitation of the opportunities arising from their sovereignty [...] is blocked by the international treaties that institutionalise the global international order."* (Pokol, 2014, p. 6)

3   MADE IN AMERICA

Hearing the ideas referred to, it is difficult to abstract from an American example. In his farewell address on 17 January 1961, President Eisenhower warned of *"the institutionalised system of cooperation among political, business, military and scientific elite groups which has become established since World War II, which has brought the processes of*

production under its control in such a way that society is unable to control them." (Eisenhower, 1961)

Andrew Mullen pointed out in this context – in this case, of course, following the example of the US – that the defence industry is supporting this with intensive media propaganda (Mullen, 2010). Then, in a paper published in Critical Sociology (Rothe and Collins, 2018, p. 16), the researchers come to the dilemma of the captured state and *"show that behind the military-industrial dependence of developed economies lies a spectacular cycle of power legitimation that in the US is reinforced and accepted by the masses, embedded in a nationalist-national security ideology."* (Cieleszky, 2021, p. 22). The military-industrial dependence can certainly be replaced by the notion of consumption dependence, and the globalised world will be equally adaptable to this approach.

Finally, a 2014 study by two Princeton professors concludes the American story by stating that *"when the interests of the average voter and the economic elite do not coincide, final policy decisions are very highly correlated (0.78 correlation) with the economic elite's position and very rarely correlated (0.05 correlation) with the average voter's position."* (Gilens and Page, 2014, p. 571). This raises problems of legitimacy of power, which, together with the decline of America's leadership role and the devaluation of the values it represents (Kagan, 2015), promises a difficult future.

The example clearly shows how certain effects of globalisation and the pressure-exerting role of the economic elite in the area of security connect secured living spaces of a social nature for the individual, which are community-defined in the area of social coexistence and which can be applied to international relations affecting the relations between individual states, for example in terms of the United States.

4   GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY DEFICITS

In a broader context, economist Dani Rodrik has taken a quite unique perspective on the possibility of democratic value choices within the nation-state framework to be fulfilled in the global structure – providing a crucial framework for understanding security. His theory of the trilemma (Rodrik, 2021) is that the three poles of choice are goals driven by nation-state interests, democratic political goals, and goals towards the realisation of a connection to the globalised world economy through deep economic integration (Cieleszky, 2021). But, in his view, only two objectives can be more fully realised simultaneously, with the consequence, in my view, of creating a deficit in every election, which we can safely call a security deficit.

In the choice of nation-state interests and economic integration, a democratic recession that favours the strengthening of authoritarian states; in the case of economic integration and the development of a democratic political system, a loss of identity leading to the emergence of parallel societies; and, when the democratic framework and the interests of the nation-state are unfolding, the backwardness resulting from the lack of integration, which leads to lower levels of well-being and thus existential security.

It is clear that security is compromised in all three choices. In the case of the first one, in particular, by openly or more covertly restricting the fundamental rights of persons.

In the second case, due to the uncontrollability of the internal order of social coexistence – manifested, for example, in the deterioration of the public security situation. And in the third case, because of the fall in living standards and the known consequences thereof.

Finally, let us quote the European Commission's reflection on the EU's strategy for the Security Union, which states: *"Security is not only the basis for personal safety, it also protects fundamental rights and provides the foundation for confidence and dynamism in our economy, our society and our democracy."* (Európai Bizottság, 2020, p. 1). The strategy has thus explicitly expressed the intertwining concerning the secure areas of international relations affecting the social relations of the individual, community-determined state relations and the relations between individual states, which I have described in more detail in this chapter.

Therefore, if we start from an ordinary approach to security, we can also take a short route – through the impact of globalisation – to the recognition of the multifaceted and complex threats to security, and to the identification of security deficits. In the present case, these are manifested in the loss of freedom, loss of identity or existential threat. A further study could aim to compare the effects of these deficits with the perceptions affected by the referenced psychological mechanisms.

5   SECURITY FROM A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE

As Zoltán Balla puts it, *"the word 'security' is the term that most closely captures the essence of law enforcement"* (Balla, 2017, p. 19), and it is no coincidence that *"the scientific study and analysis of security is dealt with by military science and the emerging field of law enforcement science."* (Balla, 2017, p. 19). It seems clear, therefore, that there are aspects of the establishment of security (in the narrow sense of the term) that relate to the law enforcement field – just as it is true that *"from the aspect of military science, it is the military elements of security that must be sought"* (Dr. Vida, 2013, p. 104). In a sense, this formulation can serve as a starting point, but it certainly needs to be nuanced, for several reasons.

There is no doubt that within the state as a reference object, the boundaries that used to separate the issues of external and internal security seem to be disappearing, blurring and in some instances dissolving (Finszter, 2018). At the same time, as I have argued before, globalisation permeates almost every aspect of life, with the world economy as its driving force – which, according to some, is the perspective from which globalisation itself can be most readily discussed (Irk, 2012). The fact of the changes indicated has implications for the law enforcement-focused approach to security (Balla, 2017) and the military elements of national defence management.

However, this is only a seemingly obvious situation. It is well known that law enforcement administration was born out of national defence administration, and the creation of the modern state provided the interpretative framework for the transformation of these disciplines into professions. *"The rise to professional status of these two types of emergency response has been accompanied by the fact that the two service activities moved*

away from each other. Being a nation-state has made the qualitative difference between internal and external threats clear." (Finszter, 2018, p. 25)

However, with the distortion of the Westphalian system – one element of which is clearly the impact of globalisation – these internal-external boundaries have again become blurred, as have the boundaries between the two administrative areas. In international politics, we need only think of the failures of the military peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period, which led to the complexity of the new types of interventions and the expansion of their conflict resolution tools from 1988 onwards (Gazdag and Remek, 2018). And in the case of individual states, numerous twentieth-century examples have shown that *"the preferred solution to unbridled arbitrariness is to operate the army as police and the police as an army."* (Finszter, 2018, p. 25). So the delimitation was not easy, even after all this time.

In addition, it can be observed that the national defence and the once separate and autonomous law enforcement administration tended to emphasise their priority in the creation of security, often over any other – i.e. sectoral – actors, if they were even noticed at all. However, liberal and critical approaches to security theory have pointed out that there is no single or exclusive custodian of security today. The interest of society as a whole, in the broadest, cosmopolitan sense of the word. In his "skeptical criminology"(Irk, 2012), Ferenc Irk explains that the twentieth century has opened up a complex of challenges that have redrawn the conditions of existence of human communities and ushered in the era of the world risk society (Finszter, 2018).

The conclusions can be taken even further. Because, while there is no single custodian for the creation of security, it is also true that today, without the concerted action of all the custodians, real security is unthinkable. And this can only be realised through value-based thinking. This is why I have emphasised in the basic premises that, among the invariant elements included in the conceptualisation of security, it is worth starting the research with the examination of the concepts of order and value.

6   ON THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY

The previous traditional view was that the only threat to international security was military aggression between states (Albrecht, 2006). Today, this view has been refined and is seen as one of the sources of danger, however broadly we interpret the concept of military aggression. This is due to several reasons. However, Ferenc Irk's comment on globalisation can be seen as a precursor to the problem, as he believes that globalisation should primarily no longer be understood in a geographical or physical sense, but as *"a specific set of functional, political and value dimensions"* (Irk, 2012, p. 24). This also touches on the question of the social legitimacy of power, since *"if [...] in all existential questions concerning the future, governments are no longer capable of more than merely pointing to the objective constraints of the transnational economy as overwhelming, any politics will be reduced to a charade of inertia and the democratic state will lose its legitimacy. And globalisation is becoming a trap for democracy."* (Hans-Peter and Schumann, 1998, p. 20). The process outlined is having the effect of significantly weakening the legitimate framework for security,

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including its community and institutional aspects, and reducing the range of instruments available to it.

The challenge of modern law enforcement thus goes hand in hand with the change in the social legitimation of power, which is inextricably linked to globalisation. Therefore, one of the future's key questions, as regards the law enforcement aspects of security (as part of civil administration), is, on the one hand, how to integrate the communities involved in the creation of security, taking into account their sectoral characteristics, and, on the other hand, how to organise, as an organisational form, the framework of its institutional functioning, as the resources of a system based on the sovereignty of individual states are necessarily exhausted by globalisation. On the latter question, the manifest manifestations of integrationist theories (EU) are as much in evidence among the solutions as the possibilities of extending global governance (a global network of international institutions, regimes, NGOs, states and other entities) in the absence of global government (Balogh, 2013).

7   ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES

It is easy to see that *"the growing dependence of domestic policies on the international environment is placing increasing demands on the adaptive capacity of states."* (Remek, 2017, pp. 134–135). However, I also think it is important to note that this has to be done in a reconfiguring legitimation context, where there is a significant change in the social relationship to power. One of the determining factors is that challenges, which may appear in the future in parallel, sometimes amplifying each other, have different effects on the lives of human communities and community formations at different levels of conditioning, and even more so on the predictability of the consequences. And the fact that this is the case is a major determinant of the chances of achieving global security.

It is of course difficult to measure the conditioning of the mindset of individual communities, but it is certain that our livelihoods and needs are guaranteed at a higher level in democratic systems. Also worthy of mention is Michael W. Doyle's keynote from the 1980s, known as the theory of democratic peace. The essence of his idea (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b), as expressed in two of his studies, is that practice shows that countries with democratic regimes do not, or much less frequently, engage in wars with each other than those with authoritarian regimes. This idea goes all the way back to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Rácz, 2018), but Doyle did not have to wait centuries for its impact. The export of democracy has become the official ideology of the USA (Rácz, 2018). Regardless of its known downsides, there is no doubt that the part of the world that embraces democratic values seems to have become more peaceful at the same time. In this context, it is worth drawing attention to three things.

Several studies have recently addressed the question of what proportion of the world's population lives in democratic or what can be considered democratic conditions. According to one study, the proportion of the population living in democracies as a percentage of the total population has remained stable since 2005 at around 52-55%, which represents a democratic surplus of 55% in terms of the number of individual countries (Our

Word in Data, 2021). Other research is slightly more moderate, with an estimate of 48.4% for the total population and 45.5% for countries (Demokracy Index 2019, 2021).

Stanford University professor Larry J. Diamond points out in a study that the dynamic of the spread of democratic values has been replaced by decades of stagnation around the world – which he calls a democratic recession. It also points to the fact that between 2010 and 2014, 25 countries experienced a so-called democratic regression, sometimes with an authoritarian character, affecting the internal legitimacy of these regimes (Diamond, 2015).

According to the Bennett Institute's 2020 report, it is clear that distrust and dissatisfaction with the democratic process is evident in both developing and developed democracies and has been monotonically increasing for almost two decades (the share of the population affected has increased by 9.7% in just over two decades, from 47.9% to 57.5%).

In the light of the above, one of the most important dilemmas is how to create a political, social and economic environment that provides supportive conditions for the development of a democratic system on the globe, while ensuring that democratic states trapped by globalisation can retain their sovereignty by prioritising a legitimate entity that is acceptable to all participants. Both problems are significant in their own right, and without a solution, a framework for security cannot be established either. More precisely, security in the traditional sense (security of a given territory) can be guaranteed, but only for a time, according to historical experience. However, higher levels of integration are unthinkable, and without it, there is no chance of addressing the challenges effectively.

CONCLUSION

My interpretation is that our need to create security comes from an a priori source. Its framework is determined by the group size characteristic of primates, and its content is saturated with psychological mechanisms that have evolved through evolutionary adaptation. In our increasingly complex social relations, our insistence on systematic thinking stems from and can be traced back to the unchanging need for a value-based order. I have called this claim the idea of order, which, as an expression of these determinations at the level of thought, can be considered a construction standing on the pedestal of current reality.

However, in the diversity of civilisations and cultures, the original patterns of the source that appears as the idea of order are rarely clearly visible. The more complex the conditions of existence that delimit the daily lives of human communities, the more transversal the relationship between the need and the act aimed at satisfying it becomes, and the greater the resource requirements for achieving security within a given framework will be. The fact of this causes a legitimation problem, the impact of which is amplified by globalization, the typical mode of operation of the world organised according to system-level and network-like patterns.

Democracy, which can be considered the optimised mode of operation of the developed world, is in a legitimacy crisis. Democratic countries, as well as communities with other arrangements and different levels of conditioning, at different stages of development,

have become responsible for the emergence of challenges that are far greater than those that humanity is globally prepared to overcome. While previously there was no global threat of anthropogenic origin, today not only has a new form of these challenges emerged, but one of them – climate change – has emerged, the consequences of which are partly irreversible and can only be tackled by calculating a certain realistic loss that can be planned.

In short, we can easily lose our ability to take back control over the area of the future that we were able to shape earlier and make corrections. The individual actions and capabilities of countries are not enough, and international organisations are not effective enough. And while there is certainly a reserve in the system of cooperation, it is difficult to say at this stage to what extent the level of global capacity to act can be meaningfully raised by mobilising these reserves.

It is therefore worth reflecting on how to go beyond the boundaries that limit our traditional solutions, which today are at the level of real policy. Or, more precisely, in addition to real policy responses, such as improving the quality and effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, innovative solutions must be sought to develop the right level of global capacity to act.

In my view, therefore, these are the circumstances that will have a decisive impact on the challenges of law enforcement in the 21st century.

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